

Digitalizing national heritage: Cultural politics of “Culture Archetype Project” in South Korea

Jung-yup Lee
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Introduction

This essay examines the recent development of South Korean (hereafter, Korean) cultural policy from 1998 to 2007 in the context of the changing transnational and national economy and culture. My focus is the shifting role of the state and public policy in mediating the economy and culture on the one hand and in reconstructing the national on the other. In other words, the essay examines how discursive and institutional practices of public cultural policy contributed to the reconstruction of the space of the national economy and culture in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1997. The post-developmental Korean state led the transformation of the whole society toward the neoliberal rationalities of global standards and competitiveness. In this larger context, cultural policy illustrates how the globally circulating discourses of globalization and the knowledge-based economy informed the transformative visions of the state, which became a normative script for the post-developmental, post-crisis social reorganization. Cultural policy especially provided spatial imaginaries in which the national economy was reimagined through technological and transnational association.

The theoretical and empirical focus of this essay is the relation between the state, economy and culture. In this essay, culture takes the “centrality” (Hall, 1997) in two different, but related, senses in relation to the state and economy. First, culture takes an “epistemological” centrality in which “economic and social processes themselves depend on meaning and have consequences for our ways of life” (Hall, 1997: 222). Thus in this cultural paradigm, the state and economy are regarded as the discursive and technical formations and constructions, rather than pre-existing entities outside of discourses and knowledge. Second, culture takes a “substantive” centrality, that is, “culture’s place in the actual empirical structure and organization of cultural activities, institutions and relationships of society” (Hall, 1997: 208), especially when the contemporary processes of transnationalization and informatization render culture in closer relation to the state and economy. In this context, the substantive culture not just becomes the object of economic activities and the state policy, but increasingly provides the principles of transformation of the state and economy (Gibson and Kong, 2005: 542).

The question of the articulation of the state, economy and culture is especially interesting in the Korean context because of its developmental legacy in which the state took the leading role in the formation and transformation of the national economy. I take a theoretical position which treats the state not only as an institutional reality, but as a culturally and discursively constructed formation, and examine how the Korean state has repositioned at the intersection of the transnational and the national on the one hand and the economy and culture on the other. To this point, I will focus on the discursive and institutional practices of a specific governmental cultural policy agency, the Korean Culture and Content Agency (KOCCA) and its central project called the Culture Archetype Project, which aimed to build digital database based on traditional cultural assets for the purpose of industrial production.

By way of providing the theoretical framework for the analysis of the state, economy and culture, I will examine the developmentalist perspective on the Korea state in the next section. Then I put the state and cultural policy in the historical and contemporary context before going into the detailed analysis of the discursive and institutional practices of cultural policy.

The Korean developmental state from the perspective of cultural formation

The developmental state perspective provides a prominent explanation of the Korean state and economy (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1992). This perspective highlights that it was the state that led rapid economic growth and industrial modernization among East Asian countries in the post-War era.¹ It conceptualizes the state as represented by well-organized, coherent and competent government bureaucracy which committed itself to, and rationally calculated, the economic transformation and growth. It characterizes the East Asian developmental states as relatively autonomous from, but embedded in, society: it was not captured by sectarian interests, but organically connected to, society which was represented by private industrial sectors. This “embedded autonomy,” it is argued, enabled the state to accomplish its role of “fostering economic transformation and guaranteeing minimal level of welfare” (Evans, 1995: 5).

The developmentalist perspective, however, is very limited in explaining the broad transformation of the state and economy and has been criticized from different positions due to its theoretical problems and its political implications. I will discuss these points of critiques in terms of conceptual and theoretical problems concerning the modern state and economy, and then in terms of more specific contextual problems concerning the Korean developmental state and policies. By way of the critiques, I will articulate the theoretical position I take regarding the relation between the state, economy and culture.

At the theoretical level, the developmentalist perspective conceptualizes the state and economy as discrete and bounded institutions external to each other. On the one hand, it assumes the economy as a pre-given object of state policy and naturalizes the economic development and modernization as the taken-for-granted objectives of the state. In order to be a stable object of the state intervention, however, the economy needs to be constructed as an entity abstracted and “disposed” from a vast unorganized social and economic world (Foucault, 1991: 95; also, Daly, 1991: 91; Hudson, 2004: 450). This construction depends on the historical process in which specific knowledge and techniques of the economy are applied, and its representations are produced and reproduced (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5; Rose and Miller, 1992: 183). Thus the objectives of development and modernization of the national economy which constituted political rationalities of the developmental state were neither natural nor pre-given: they were dependent on political-technical as well as specific discursive construction of the bounded space of economic activities (Jessop, 1999: 13). The developmentalist perspective fails to understand how the space of the national economy was contingently and historically constructed and how it was made possible as an object of state intervention, adjustment and management by a presumably external state through discursive and technical processes (Mitchell, 2008: 1117).

On the other hand, the developmentalist perspective reduces the state to the subjective intentions of government bureaucracy and treats it as a freestanding actor outside the economy and imposing developmental policies upon private actors. Evans’s advanced concept of “embeddedness” of the state still presupposes a demarcated entity of the state with capacity and power in advance, separated from the other social world and economy. In other words, the developmental state perspective assumes the state as discrete and bounded and does not question the process in which the state appears to be separate from, and standing above, the rest of society and gains its authority and legitimacy as a superior power (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 154-155; Mitchell, 1999: 81-82). Mitchell (1999) points out that it is the very distinction that produces the effect in which the modern state appears to be an abstract power structure standing outside the whole social world (89).

At the specific and concrete and historical level of the state form and policies, on the one hand, the developmentalist perspective neglects the international regime into which the developmental states were inserted. In fact, Evans pays some attention to the international division of labor in which the Korean developmental state carved out a specific comparative advantage (Evans, 1995: 95), but in his framework the international context only constituted a background which an developmental state took into calculation for its action and strategies. Critics point out that it was within the geopolitical environment of the Cold War that the developmental state was enabled to facilitate, mediate and support strategic industrial sectors to achieve the perceived goal of modernization (Cumings, 1987;

Pempel, 1999). The discourse of national security and the regime competition against North Korea were particularly important in shaping and limiting the specifically nationalized imaginaries of the territorialized state and bounded economy in Korea (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 169). The export-led economic development path was shaped in this geopolitical overdetermination, not rationally chosen by state bureaucracy. In this way, the whole political, economic and social regime of Korea was organized around the national security and the national economic development toward exportism based on specific territorial and political imaginaries of the nation-state and the national economy (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 169).

On the other hand, the developmental state perspective neglects the domestic socio-political aspect due to its reduction of society to large industrial sectors. It pays little attention to the important socio-political regulation of population not only through a military-like discipline and social control, but through political discourses and techniques in the deployment of social policy and the construction of social cohesion through official national culture.

The repression of labor was an indispensable part of the developmental economic transformation as low wages were necessary to keep the production cost low for the export-led economic growth and modernization (Cho, 2000; Cho and Kim, 1998). Furthermore, social policy in this era aimed at disciplining and producing developmental workers-subjects for the sublime goal for economic development. These political technologies included the bio-political regulation of labor body such as child planning, nutrition, sanitation and hygiene, and the production of the developmental mind of “diligence, self-help and co-operation” through state-led campaigns such as the New Village Campaign (*Sae-maeul Undong*)(Cho, 2004).

It was in this context which cultural policy, within the overall developmental political rationalities, became an important part of disciplinary social policy of producing national subjects devoted to the political project of economic development and industrial modernization. Woo-Cumings (1999) points out that it was the ideology of economic nationalism which discursively buttressed the developmental state project and enabled the state to establish itself as a coherent and legitimate embodiment of universal, common and national interest. Cultural policy distinctively provided concrete and nationalized narratives and imaginaries which naturalized the nation-state and the national economy for the objectives of the “modernization of the fatherland” and the “revival of national culture” (Jager, 2003; Yim, 2002). In this framework, cultural policy mobilized selective cultural traditions and legacies to bring up a paternalist-nationalist sentiment as it centered on the promotion and preservation of high culture and arts and traditional culture (Jung, 2008). Commercial popular culture, as well as foreign popular culture (especially, Japanese culture as a whole), was conceived as dysfunctional to the demand for mass mobilization and put under tight control of the state such as regular crackdown, censorship and outright banning. In this condition, the industrial aspect of culture could not get serious attention and suffered underdevelopment.

In this section, I contrast the developmentalist perspective with the perspective which regards the historical form of the developmental state as a cultural formation and specific effects of political discourses and techniques, rather than a taken-for-granted entity. The developmental state, most of all, depended on the construction of the object of the bounded national economy under the political objectives of economic growth and industrial modernization. Through political discourses and technologies, the naturalized entities of the national economy and the nation-state were imagined and institutionalized within a specific boundary and limit.

This perspective also highlights the notion of the national as a normative basis for the social organization and the formation of the state in Korea. In the process of the construction of nationalized imaginaries, the developmental state emerged as a bearer of the universal, public and common interest, institutionally embodying national desire for development and modernization. In this sense, the developmental state was a specific discursive formation which articulated different discursive elements from nationalism to economic developmentalism. In other words, the developmental state cannot be reduced to a specific set of state policies and bureaucratic institutions or to authoritarian

repression and forced mobilization: it needs to be understood as a discursive formation in which political rationalities of development and modernization were articulated to nationalist desire through the discursive and technical construction of political objects of the national economy.

Lastly, in this perspective I presented in this section, it is suggested that the naturalization of the institutional separation between the economy and the state is unstable and always needs to be redefined through discursive and technical measures in response to the changing conditions (Jessop, 2001). Thus it enables us to understand the post-developmental transition and transformation of the Korean state, economy, society and culture as the emergence and institutionalization of new political rationalities at the shifting limit of the state and the economy in the broad context of geopolitical and global economic environment.

The Korean state in the post-developmental turn

The developmental mode of rule, dependent on specific separation and articulation between the state, economy and society, manifested a series of crisis from the mid 1970s and proved unsustainable especially from the late 1980s when there exploded the demands for political liberty, labor rights and economic liberation from various sectors (Cho, 2000: 413). It was required that the questioned relation between the state, economy and society should be re-articulated and the shaken political object of the national economy be reconstituted in the shifting context.

The Kim Young-sam government (1993-1997), led by the first civilian president since the military coup in 1961, attempted at a top-down, conservative political transition and the neoliberal economic transformation from the authoritarian developmental regime (Cho, 2000). However, the financial crisis and the intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November of 1997 overdetermined the conservative-neoliberal transformation ventured in the mid 1990s. The crisis constituted a critical conjuncture which put the existing ideas of the nation-state and the national economy into serious question and demanded a fundamental transformation of the Korean economy and society.

It was the two globally circulating, interlocking meta-narratives of globalization and the knowledge-based economy (KBE) which largely informed the emerging governing rationalities and the reorganization of the Korean state, economy and society. These overarching meta-narratives constituted a normative prescription for neoliberal socio-economic transformation in Korea. Taking varying discursive forms of state mega-visions such as the “knowledge-based nation (KBN),” the “central nation in Northeast Asia,” the “creative nation” and so forth, these normative organizing principles of the whole society, although they were never consistent but full of confusions and contradictions, guided the way in which specific political objects were shaped, the boundaries between the state and the economy/society were redrawn, and the space for the national economy was reconstituted. In this neoliberal context, the state projects were not just a continuation from the previous government, but more thorough and systematic programs for the reconstruction of the space of the national economy in association with high technologies and transnational cultural flows in East Asia.

These visions were based on specific technology-driven assumptions and periodization. The valorization and the industrial support of information, knowledge and culture was justified in this single-minded normative prescription for the post-developmental reorganization of the national economy.

President Kim Dae-jung pushed technology-related policy, including IT policy and cultural policy for the post-crisis economic boost for the next developmental step of the national economy. The Kim government (1998-2002) declared the vision of the “knowledge-based nation” as a state program for the “Rebuilding Korea” (D.-j. Kim, 1998: 422). Kim presented it as “transforming the industrial

nation which is based on materials into the knowledge-based nation which is based on creative knowledge and information” (D.j. Kim, 1998: 422). It was a statist version modified from the “knowledge-based economy,” the vision of which was recommended as new engine for economic transformation by various transnational organizations including the OECD (1998), the World Bank (2000) and the UNESCO (P.-j. Kim, 2000: 33; Hong, 1999: 266).

The KBE, a more sophisticated discourse than the information society discourse, emphasized the commodification of immaterial goods and services, the application of information and knowledge to the production, and the exploitation of intellectual property (Jessop, 2004, p. 168). Thus it required the significant transformation of the national economy in which the extra-economic such as education, culture, science and technology was regulated to promote innovation and re-articulated to the economic (Jessop, 2004: 169).

Discourses such as the “age of creativity, culture and content” entered on stage under Roh Moo-hyun government, were still predicated on the technology-driven assumptions and periodization. For instance, one government cultural policy document, *C-Korea 2010* (MCT, 2005) declared the “advent of the age of the creative culture-based economy,” which was regarded as following the knowledge-based economy. It continued, “Culture and content based on creativity and feelings has a great influence on the competitiveness of the national economy” (8-9). On this basis, the document sets the national goal of becoming one of “world's top five content powers” in 2010 (19). Most of all, these policy claims were based on a certain understanding of the technological developmental stage of the Korean economy. The emphasis on content assumed that Korea achieved a high level of technological advance such as mobile and high-speed Internet networks, which in turn was regarded as a firm basis for the next development of culture and content.

In the latter part of the essay, I will examine how discursive and institutional practices of cultural policy unfolded in Korea under the two democratic governments. Informed by the metanarratives of globalization and the KBE, the two governments regarded culture as central to enhancing global competitiveness. The political programs of cultural policy categorized and classified culture as a manageable object through expert knowledge. In this policy scheme, national culture was redefined in association with technological and the transnational imagination. Culture was linked up with information and communications technologies in the KBE: it was framed as “culture content” and “culture technology” (CT), designated as one of six future engines for national development, and systematically managed, mapped, researched and developed in the university and private and public institutions.

The practices of cultural policy were also predicated on the development of the “Korean Wave,” the transnational popularity of Korean popular culture in East Asia. Riding on this development, culture policy regarded culture as contributing to economic growth through cultural exports; it also articulated tactile images of how globalization and informatization of national economy and culture would look like. In effect, the redefined culture via cultural policy reconstructed the national cultural imaginaries which constituted the space of the national economy in a refashioned way.

The KOCCA and the cultural policy discourses

The KOCCA, a governmental cultural policy agency, was established under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) in August 2001 with the purpose of promoting the culture and content industries. It was not a novel idea to set up a legal and institutional framework for the promotion of the industry within the developmental legacy in Korea. In the early 2000s, the government was confident that the promotional policy for some industries could be successful as they saw that the promotion of the information technologies (IT) industry, which excited the “venture boom,” was successful to overcome the financial crisis (Interview with Jeon Hyeon-taek, former manager at the KOCCA, conducted August 27, 2008).

The KOCCA governed the cultural industries areas which were not already covered by other public institutes: characters, comics, music, animation, traditional culture, and partly games. At the time of launching the annual budget of about 100 billion won looked relatively big because there was no precedent occasion in which government spent that amount money for the related industries (Interview with Jeon). As the areas it covered were typically dominated by small-sized or venture start-up companies (unlike film and broadcasting), it was considered as a significant volume enough to make some impact to the industries (Interview with Ahn Seok-jun, former assistant manager at the KOCCA, conducted August 5, 2008).

The KOCCA's main business operations covered from providing supports for the exportation of cultural products, the education for content creation, the development of related technologies ("culture technology (CT)"), building digital archives of traditional culture ("culture archetypes"), to providing other financial, legal and policy supports for related industries.

For the export supports, the KOCCA established four overseas offices (Tokyo, Beijing, London, and LA) and built the web platform called the Culture Content Export Information System (CEIS) for gathering overseas market information and providing supports for companies operating in the locations. For the development of human resources, it provided education and training programs for the content production and business marketing. It ran the Korea Content Academy and provided training programs for both online and offline, supported cultural industry-related courses in the universities, supported training programs for other institutes, and supported training and internship programs abroad (Yim, 2005: 12). For the CT development, it invested about 10 billion won annually, and worked closely with research universities, including not just engineering but humanities and arts. For the development of culture content, it especially focused on the support for the "global star content" as well as culture archetypes.

As its activities suggested, the policy scheme of the promotion of the cultural industries by the KOCCA and the Korean government was based on specific construction of culture: culture as content, with a strong technological implication and with exportation as the goal. The inter-related terms of content, technology and exports suggest a neoliberal orientation, but distinctive inflection of the Korean cultural policy formation.

Culture as content

First, the term content started to be used in the Internet business world for whatever was distributed and circulated on media platforms especially in various digitized forms. In Korea, the term "contents" (*kontents*) has been used instead of the grammatically correct term, content. It seemed that the Japanese pronunciation and transliteration *kontentsu* influenced the Korean usage. In fact, the related industries were called the *kontentsu* or *kontents* industries in Japan and Korea although the "cultural industries," the "entertainment industries" and the "creative industries" were usual terms outside the two countries. The term *kontents* became a legitimate vocabulary used not just in the internet industry, but throughout the media and cultural industries and policy circle in Korea.

The combination of the two terms, *munhwa kontents* (culture content), was a distinctive, if not exclusive, development in Korea. As opposed to the term, *kontentsu*, the combined term, *bunka kontentsu*, was not frequently used in Japan. In fact, Ryu Seung-Ho, adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Culture Technology (GSCT) at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) claimed that he himself invented the term, *munhwa kontents*, when he was working at the Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute (KCTPI). He claimed that he used it from 1999 to replace commonly used terms such as "software," "information," "digital content" and so forth. He explains that he intended to emphasize the cultural components which were expected to be more used within "contents" on the one hand, and to claim the policy initiative of the MCT against the Ministry of

Information and Communication (MIC) on the other (S.-h. Ryu, 2005). With its credit aside, the buzzword culture content has gained currency among the related industries and policy circle especially after the KOCCA adopted the term in its name in 2001.

More importantly, emphasizing the affinity and distinctiveness between information technology and culture at the same time, the term worked effectively in practical terms when the MCT claimed its share of the IMT-2000 fund. The fund, which amounted to 13,000 billion won in 2001, was built from the contribution by telecommunication companies for the purpose of supporting the long-term R&D investment in the IT (Hwang, 2006), but partly used for the economic boost and allocated to the R&D for other technologically-related areas. In fact, the start-up fund for the KOCCA came from the IMT-2000 fund (MCT, 2002: 25-26), which was justified by the claims of the affinity between culture and information technology (Interview with Jeon). As such, culture content was a convenient term which implied information and communication technology on the one hand, and the autonomy of the domain of culture on the other. The term evolved into a guiding term to redefine the relevant domain of culture.

Culture Technology

Second, the techno-economic orientation of cultural policy was more obvious and concrete in another term, “culture technology (CT),” which was also closely related to the activities of the KOCCA. The concept of CT was presented in the book, *Culture and Arts in the Digital Age* (Choi, 1999), written by eleven engineering and humanities professors at the KAIST (Choi, 2006: 93). Then it was introduced by Won Kwang-Yeon, professor at the KAIST, in his report to the presidential office in July 2001 (Shim, 2003: 170). The Korean government immediately adopted it as the sixth core technological engine for economic growth in the twenty first century in addition to the five already-adopted technologies such as bio technology (BT), environment technology (ET), nano technology (NT), space technology (ST), and information technology (IT) (Choi, 2006: 93; MCT, 2007: 75). The introduction of the term and its inclusion as the core object of public policy reinforced the position of the MCT and enabled it to govern the domain of digital media in relation to culture and content (Choi, 2006: 94-95).

CT was defined as, “in a narrow sense, technologies used in the value chain of culture content from the planning, commercialization, loading to media platforms, to distribution, and in a wide sense, complex technologies which are necessary for enhancing added value to cultural products, including knowledge and knowhow from humanities and social science, design, and arts as well as science and engineering” (MCT and KOCCA, 2005: 4). In other words, the term CT was applied to different stage of content development from raw cultural materials to value-added cultural content products.

In 2005, to build a close industry-academic research-government connection, the GSCT was established at the KAIST, whose Dean was Won, and has been funded by the MCT 30-50 billion won annually. The KOCCA was responsible for the establishment of the CT policy and the support and coordination of the CT. In 2005, the KOCCA announced the “roadmap of CT development” (MCT and KOCCA, 2005). In the document, various technologies were enumerated from 3D animation, interactive cinema and music, digital animation creation software, portable game terminal, intelligent broadcasting, multimedia electronic publishing, restoration system for culture archetypes, and so forth, across genres such as game, music, broadcasting, film, publishing, and animation. It also introduced technologies for content creation such as technologies for knowledge auto-creation, feeling-based knowledge creation, storyboard template creation, content-based narrative auto-creation and so forth. In spite of the broad definition of the concept, in fact, the development of CT was engineering and technology-oriented as shown in the technologies listed above. Those technologies have been developed by or in relation with the digital engineering-oriented institutions such as the KAIST and the Electronic and Telecommunication Research Institute (ETRI). Choi (2006) points out that those

technologies “have little to do with enhancing the creativity of creators who actually create culture and arts” and “are no different than IT technologies” (98-99).

The cultural policy of CT was the government-led national mobilization and organization of knowledge. It aimed at the industrialization and commercialization of culture, the value creation of content, and further, the transformation of the national economy. Most notable was that it required that knowledge from humanities and especially Korean studies such as Korean literature, arts, history, folklore studies be involved in CT and connected to applied social science, management, and digital arts. The KOCCA's project of culture archetypes, which I will describe in the next section, was the example of the involvement of humanities in the development of CT.

Cultural exports

Third, the KOCCA's promotion policy scheme was greatly centered on the goal of cultural exports. After the financial crisis in 1997, exports have been regarded as crucial to the Korean economy as the only way to escape the crisis. The idea of linking up culture with exports, however, appeared in public policy and public discourse as late as in 2000. Until then, newspaper articles and government documents rarely contained both words of “culture” and “export” in the same page.

It was obviously related to, and stimulated by the newly discovered phenomenon of the Korean Wave across East Asia. Although the attention to the cultural industries by the Korea government went back to the early 1990s, it was under the Kim Dae-jung government when the Korean Wave phenomenon started to draw the public attention and excitement that the concepts of culture and exports explicitly linked. In the despair of the financial crisis, the popularity of Korean popular cultural products such as popular music, film and television drama began to be reported in major newspapers in a highly hopeful tone.

It is unmistakable that culture was framed in economic terms: in terms of profit-making through exports. But the economic significance was implicitly translated back into symbolic and cultural one. In other words, the Korean Wave and cultural exports were significant not just because it earned money from overseas, but more importantly, because it provided a sense of “winning” over other countries. The economization of culture was not just about a commodification or instrumentalization of culture, but more specifically about the subordination of culture to the framework of exports. Regardless of the real performance in numbers, cultural exports excited Koreans in spirit because they really provided the sense of being among the advanced countries, and being competitive and equal in terms of culture just like in terms of the economy. Thus the effects of cultural exports (and the Korean Wave) were cultural-political as well as economic.

Government public discourses of cultural policy such as culture content, culture technology and cultural exports highlight how culture was valorized in its economic value and its transnational implications. Culture became a policy object manageable through technological classification as concrete industrial forms of content under the national economic goal for exportation. In this operational redefinition of culture for the policy intervention, the Korean state repositioned itself as a mediator between different domains, as a facilitator of the techno-industrialization of culture content, and as a representer of the public desire for the transformation of the national economy in the age of knowledge-based or creative culture-based economy in which national competitiveness was presumed to depend on the national capacities of the production of culture and content.

The Culture Archetype Project

The Culture Archetype Project illustrates the way in which culture was converted to content, and reconfigured through technological process, and national culture and identity were redefined through the perspective of the economy, technology and the transnational imagination. The Project has been a

major business since the foundation of the KOCCA in 2001. The Project aimed to develop traditional cultural assets such as history, myths, fables, religion, folklore, and customs into digital content forms and to use as materials for further content creation and production.

The term “culture archetype” appeared in the official documents for the first time in 1999: “Five-year plan for cultural industry promotion” (1999) and the Cultural Industry Promotion Act (1999) (K.-b. Kim, 2006). The Project was developed in a concrete form in the subsequent government documents. In “Cultural industry vision 21: Five-year plan for cultural industry promotion” (MCT, 2000), composed by the MCT as a revision of the previous year’s plan, the Project was planned as building a multimedia database for the culture information network service, a database of traditional culture “to be used as materials for the planning and creation in the cultural industries and as social indirect capital” (MCT, 2000: 17). In the next year, “Content Korea vision 21: Action plan for the development of culture content industries” (MCT, 2001), a blueprint for the KOCCA, included the Culture Archetype Project as one of the KOCCA’s main tasks. The project was defined more clearly as “the digitalization of tangible and intangible cultural properties and the development of archives and multimedia content” (MCT, 2001: 14). The document also made a financial plan for the project and assigned 20 billion won out of total 55 billion won for the content development budget which were derived from the IMT-2000 fund which is part of the Information Promotion Fund under the MIC’s management (MCT, 2001: 25). The MCT and the KOCCA continued to invest the total of 55 billion Korean won from 2002 to 2006 (MCT, 2006). This was a large amount of money unprecedentedly spent on the cultural industries: it amounted to 20 per cent of the whole budget managed by the KOCCA in the same period.

The basic operation of the Project followed the following process. First, The KOCCA invited public applications for the development of culture archetypes for creation materials. Second, it had applications examined by experts from the academia and industries. Third, it funded selected projects about 200-300 million won in average. Fourth, it publicized the prototypes and pilot materials on the web platform (www.culturecontent.com, set up in July 2004) so that they could be used for further content creation. In 2002, the first year of the project, 40 items were selected and funded out of 456 applications (MCT, 2002: 619). The project continued to invite applications every year and produced about 160 items of culture archetypes until 2006 to complete the first stage of the project (MCT, 2006: 131).

Industrial application of traditional national culture

The Culture Archetype Project aimed to link traditional culture and the industry which were previously separate domains. The content unrelated to industrial application was excluded from the application and selection for funding – that is, content only related to the simple archiving and construction of the database or with purely academic research purpose (J.-a. Ryu, 2007). The project in itself did not take aims to yield industrial products, but there presented some examples in which the results of the project were applied to various commercial area as well as public areas.

It was under the Roh government that the Project was spurred as the overall emphasis of cultural policy on creativity for national competitiveness demanded “original” sources and materials for content creation and production (MCT, 2006: 131).

Following the overarching policy line, the Culture Archetype Project gained its momentum. The project ultimately aimed to produce culture content commodities which were based on distinctively Korean characteristics and could make big global success with universal appeal. The exemplars frequently mentioned by policy practitioners and the media are the Disney animation, *Mulan* (1998), the Hollywood epic film, *The Lord of the Rings* (2001), the massive multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) by Blizzard Entertainment, *The World of Warcraft* (2001) and so on, all of which

were based on inherited stories combined with cutting-edge digital technologies. As such, the project was launched with the aspiration of producing big international hits made out of Korean culture.

CT, Storytelling and digitalization

The Culture Archetype Project was closely connected to the CT project—another main culture and content policy initiative by the government. The MCT and the KOCCA presented the roadmap of the CT development in which “cultural heritage technologies” were counted as one of main CT themes under “public technologies” (MCT and KOCCA, 2005).

The mechanical treatment of culture was based on two related concepts technologically underlying the Project and the CT project: “one-source-multi-use” (OSMU) and “digital storytelling.” The term digital storytelling bore a specific meaning. It did not just indicate a way of telling stories by using multimedia. Choi Hye-sil, who worked for the GSCT at the KAIST and served as the chairperson of the Culture Archetype Screening Committee, broadly defined it as an “original quality for narrative forms” which might be used for “various story subgenres such as literature, animation, film, games, advertising, design, home-shopping, theme park, and sports” (Choi, 2006: 104). It was coupled with another specific concept of OSMU. The term OSMU has been widely used in Korea from 2000ⁱⁱ to epitomize the flexible nature of digital content which tends to cross over different media platforms and genres and to maximize added value of the digital media products.

In these terms, the idea of the Project was to disassemble various traditional cultural elements into very basic or original forms (*wonghyeong*; archetypes), then to reassemble them into “digital storytelling” and to utilize them for various contemporary cultural content products such as games, music, film, drama, characters, and so forth. The concepts of storytelling and OSMU epitomized the industrial and technological treatment of culture as digital content.

Geographical imaginaries of national culture

The Culture Archetype Project intended to mobilize traditional national culture for the industrial transformation in the knowledge- and creativity-based economy. Traditional cultural materials mobilized for the project comprehensively included not only tangible ones such as artifacts, architecture, costumes, crafts, design patterns, and accessories but intangible ones such as historical and mythical stories, characters and events, religious practices, historic space and landscape, and performance. The attention to traditional Korean culture was based on the belief that the unique and original culture would provide resources for cultural creativity and competitiveness. As it developed, however, the project redefined what it perceived as national culture. The project was not confined to the narrow equation of national culture with traditional culture. The objects of the project were expanded to the Korean culture archetypes dispersed in Asia and then to the global cultural archetypes which was not related to traditional Korean culture in its origin.

The change of direction from largely defensive cultural policy to the promotional policy was obviously influenced by the new development of the Korea Wave. Especially, the development of cultural policy was stimulated by the domestic and international success of cultural products with Korean characteristics, especially television drama series *Daejanggeum* (originally aired in Korea in 2003). The previous media and cultural products of the Korea Wave did not have specific national attributes as exemplified by K-pop music and urban melodramas. To the contrary, the success of *Daejanggeum*, a historical story of the first female royal physician of the Joseon Dynasty, allowed cultural policy practitioners and producers to have confidence that distinctively Korean culture could have universal appeal (Interview with Jeon).

The enthusiasm for the Korea Wave crystallized into the overarching public policy goal which focused on the globalization of Korean culture with Korean characteristics and the promotion of the nation brand (MCT, 2006).

The Project evolved in this policy perception. The policy document states, “Culture content would be more valuable and competitive when it is made out of national cultural tradition,” but, it argues, “although the historical profoundness and richness of Korean traditional culture is well acknowledged in the world, its value has not been positively utilized by the culture content industries” (MCT, 2002). The project of building up digital content from traditional cultural elements was justified in the policy context of nation branding.

The initial focus was on “the development of *our own* original content” for the opening up world market (MCT, 2001). As the Project went on, however, it developed beyond a narrow concept of traditional national culture and extended to the Asian and global culture archetypes as policy object. From 2003, the KOCCA received applications in two separate categories: unrestricted and designated themes. The latter category tended to reflect what the KOCCA perceived the industrial demands as well as overall public cultural policy directions. In the latter category were included “our own [Korean] culture archetypes in Northeast Asia,” “Northeast Asian culture archetypes” and “global culture archetypes” as strategic project themes. In 2005, the KOCCA officially drop the phrase “our own” from the project to reflect the global scope of the project (K.-d. Kim, 2005).

For instance, in 2003, the KOCCA commissioned AtoonZ, an animation production company, to undertake the project called “Culture content creation materials based on Chinese culture archetypes” (KOCCA, 2009). This project, explicitly took *Mulan*, a Disney animation, as a reference point, produced multimedia digital materials of 100 Chinese fantasy stories based on ancient Chinese tales (<http://chinastory.culturecontent.com>). The commissioned company worked for translation of the original work with Chinese literature practitioners at one Korean university, and for sketches with a Chinese university and a Chinese company the latter of which had an experience of working with Warner Bros. Entertainment. This was the first case in which a project item was produced outside Korean traditional culture archetypes and non-Korean counterparts were involved.

In 2005, two more global culture archetypes were chosen as two of designated project items – “Digital content of world wine culture” and “Digital content of Angkor Wat” (MCT, 2006). The former contained text, audio and video materials based on the history and producing regions of wine (<http://wine.culturecontent.com>). The KOCCA spent 500 million won on the latter project item, the largest money spend on a single project item. The commissioned company, CGwave, built “Digital Angkor Wat” based on existing drawings of Angkor Wat (<http://angkorwat.culturecontent.com>). CT experts joined the project to mobilize culture archetype restoration technologies such as three-dimensional scanning and modelling. The project took 30,000 photos and produced three-dimensional images of the buildings, architecture, sculpture, mural paintings and carvings. The resulting content materials were composed of the three-dimensional model and the virtual museum of Angkor Wat, and sample content such as animation and two- and three-dimensional images of characters, sculpture and buildings and so forth. The digital Angkor Wat was used in the events such as 2006 Angkor-Kyeongju World Culture Expo and 2007 Kyeongju World Culture Expo (H.-d. Kim, 2006).

The expansion of culture archetypes took another direction: culture archetypes based on the geographic-historical imagination of ancient Koreans advancing to the world. The examples included “Goseonji: the pioneer of the Silk Road” (2002) (<http://www.digitalsilkroad.com>) and “Digital Hyecho: *Wang ocheonchukguk jeon* digital content” (2007) (<http://digitalhyecho.culturecontent.com>). For the former project, Heart Korea, the digital content production company, worked with the Academy of East Asian Studies at the SeongKyunKwan University. The project was based on the biography of Goseonji, the general of Tang Dynasty with Korean origin, who conquered the Western China and pioneered the Silk Road. Based on the historical researches of the battles, weapons, architecture and costumes, the project produced digital images such as characters and animations. It also produced storyboards and scenarios based on the historical stories and tales, which were meant to be used for industrial applications. The latter project was commissioned to the GSCT at the KAIST for its development. Hyecho was a Korean Buddhist monk from the kingdom of Silla in the eighth century, who travelled to India and the Islam world and wrote one of the oldest travelogues in the

world, *Wang ocheonchukguk joen (Memoir of the pilgrimage of the five kingdoms of India)*. The project digitally restored the route of his travel and ancient cultural properties. The project was composed of content creation materials such as the travelogue-based scenarios, and 3D and flash images and animations of various places. Based on the research project, the project manager, Kim Takhwan, a professor at the KAIST and a famous novelist, wrote a novel *Hyecho* (2008). The project materials including digital products were also displayed at the National Museum of Contemporary Art in 2008.

These two further developments of the project – global culture archetypes from East Asia and the world and Korean culture archetypes across Asia – suggested the changing nature of what should be included in the category of national culture. The second case geographically reimaged the space of national culture in an aggressively nationalist way while the first case flexibly put emphasis on possible industrial profits and the presumed technological advancement of Korean CT. In either case, the project was driven by an aggressive nationalist notion in which “our own” got more inclusive of culture and technology.

Public policy niche: Performing the competitive nation

The KOCCA’s Culture Archetype Project exemplified how the Korean cultural policy carved out the policy niche in face of the changing geographical scale and technological environment. The neoliberal political rationalities of market competitiveness and global standards shaped how the overarching narratives of the knowledge-based economy and globalization as the prescriptive recipe for the reconstruction of the national economy through the redefinition of culture.

The cultural policy of the Culture Archetype Project illustrates how the boundaries between the economy and culture, traditional culture and the cultural industries, digital technologies and originality, and the national and the transnational were redrawn in the context of transnationalization and informitization of culture. The project, through expert knowledge of culture and technology, discursively and technically reconstructed culture as manageable and digitally flexible object of content and technology for the industrialization and exportation. It redefined national culture in association with digital technologies and the transnational advance of the Korean popular culture for the competitiveness of the national economy and culture. The reconceived national culture – technologically advanced and globally competitive – enabled the reimagination of the space of the competitive national economy in the post-developmental, post-crisis era.

In performing the national culture in public cultural policy, the state repositioned as the mediator at the intersections of the economy and culture, and the transnational and the national. In other words, cultural policy illustrates how the post-developmental, post-crisis state attempted to reposition itself as a competitive state by valorizing culture as the central site for the future of the national economy through technological and transnational imagination.

Conclusion

The globalization narrative combined with the related techno-economic narrative of the knowledge-based economy critically informed the reorganization of the post-developmental, post-crisis Korean state, which aspired to enhance its status in the hierarchy of the international division of labor. The way these meta-narratives guided the state project could be variable, but it was the dominant neoliberal political rationalities of global competitiveness and the global standards which directed the discursive and institutional guidance of shaping the spatial reorganization of post-developmental state project in Korea. In this changing context of globalization and the knowledge-based economy, the question of culture became prominent and problematic in the transformation of the national economy.

First, the state facilitated the intensified relation of the economy and culture. The master narrative of globalization and the knowledge-based economy put culture to the central stage as innovation and creativity were emphasized as the source of global competitiveness of the nation-state and the engine for economic growth of the national economy. This indicates the subsumption as well as the valorization of “social capital,” social relations, resources and values under the logic of the economy (Jessop, 2001). In this context, culture was regarded not only as cultural artifacts which potentially contribute to the economy, but as socio-cultural resources integral to the economic transformation which could cultivate new capacities and skills for innovation and creativity in order to structurally enhance the national economy to a higher stage. Thus culture was redefined as the economy was regarded as more embedded in it. Accordingly, culture, coupled with technologies, became a main governmental object of public policy and state management. The increasing policy emphasis on intellectual property as a commodified form of culture and creativity and on the culture content industries exemplifies the intensified articulation of the economy and culture through the mediation of the state. As is exemplified by the vernacular slogan widespread in Korea, “content is competitiveness,” and the mobilization of culture for solving political, social and economic problems, the novel phenomenon of “culture as resource” characterizes the expanded role for culture in the conditions of globalization (Yúdice, 2003).

Second, the state mediated the articulation of the national and the transnational. While it did not provide a stable source of cultural identity, political legitimacy and social cohesion for state project any more, local and national culture was rearticulated to the post-developmental, post-crisis state project as it was evoked for cultural exports, tourism, nation branding and cultural diplomacy (McGuigan, 2004), all of which ultimately were presumed to contribute to global competitiveness of the national economy. The reorientation of national culture in the transnational economic and cultural flows exemplifies one specific way in which the state managed different geographical scales and redirect to the national level. In this sense, national culture was redefined less as the representation of the past, patrimony and cultural legacy and the sources of coherent cultural identity, than in relation to transnational trade and the cultural imagination in which the issue of cultural identity was addressed in a different way: the reimagining of the national through the transnational did not correspond to cultural protectionism, but signified the insertion to the transnational connections of the economy and culture. The case of Korean cultural policy and the Culture Archetype Project shows how the post-developmental competitive state of Korea engaged in the transformations of the national economy through discursive and institutional practices which were predicated on the transnational and technological reimagining of the national economy and national culture.

Bibliography

- Amsden, A. (1989) *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cho, H.-y. (2000) The structure of the South Korean developmental regime and its transformation: Statist mobilization and authoritarian integration in the anticommunist regimentation, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 1: 408-426.
- Cho, H.-y. (2004) Park Jeong-hi sidae-eui gangap-gwa dongeu [Coersion and consent under the Park era], *Yeoksa Bipyong [History Criticism]*, 67: 135-190.
- Cho, H.-Y. and Kim, E.M. (1998) State autonomy and its social conditions for economic development in South Korea and Taiwan, in E.M. Kim (ed.) *The four Asian tigers: Economic development and the global political economy*, San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Choi, H.-s. (1999) *Digital sidae-eui munhwa yesul (Culture and arts in the digital age)*, Seoul: Munhak-gwa Jiseongsa.
- Choi, H.-s. (2006) *Munhwa kontents, storytelling-eul mannada [Culture content meets storytelling]*, Seoul: SERI.

- Cumings, B. (1987) The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences, in F.C. Deyo (ed.) *The political economy of the new Asian industrialism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Daly, G. (1991) The discursive construction of economic space: logics of organization and disorganization, *Economy and society*, 20: 79-102.
- Evans, P. (1995) *Embedded economy: States and industrial transformation*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press.
- Foucault, M. (1991) Governmentality, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality*, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gibson, C. and Kong, L. (2005) Cultural economy: A critical view, *Progress in Human Geography*, 29: 541-561.
- Hall, S. (1997) The centrality of culture: Notes on the cultural revolutions of our time, in K. Thompson (ed.) *Media and cultural regulation*, London: Sage.
- Hong, S.-t. (1999) Jabonjueui jisiksahoe-wa sinjisikin bipan [A critique on the capitalist knowledge society and the discourse of new intellectuals], *Munhwa Gwahak [Culture Science]*, 19: 31-50.
- Hudson, R. (2004) Conceptualizing economies and their geographies: Spaces, flows and circuits, *Progress in Human Geography*, 28: 447-471.
- Hwang, S.-d. (2006) *Jeongbohwa chokjin gigeum [Informatization promotion fund]*, Available at: <http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=001976>.
- Jager, S.M. (2003) *Narratives of national building in Korea: A geneology of patriotism*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Jessop, B. (1999) *Narrating the future of the national economy and the national state? Remarks on remapping regulation and reinventing governance*, Available at: <http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/jessop-narrating-the-future.pdf>.
- Jessop, B. (2001) *Developmental states and knowledge-driven economies (first draft)*, Available at: <https://www.kli.re.kr/AttachFile/emate-gw/seminar/C4A9600CEE4202C149256D1600352ECE/2.16%20Bob%20Jessop%28development%29.PDF>.
- Jessop, B. (2004) Critical semiotic analysis and cultural political economy, *Critical Discourse Studies*, 1: 159-174.
- Jessop, B. and Sum, N.-L. (2006) A regulationist re-reading of East Asian newly industrializing economies: from peripheral Fordism to exportism, *Beyond the regulation approach: Putting capitalist economies in their place*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Jung, S.-j. (2008) *Muhyeongmunhwajae-ei tansaeng [The birth of intangible assets]*, Seoul: Yukbi.
- Kim, D.-j. (1998) *Guknan geukbok-eui gil: Kim Dae-jung daetongryeong chwiim yukgaeweol yeonselmunjip [The road to overcome the national crisis: President Kim Dae-jung's speeches during the first six months]*, Seoul: Office of the President.
- Kim, H.-d. (2006) *Angkor Wat-eul munhwa wonhyeong [Culture archetypes at Angkor Wat]*, Available at: http://www.culturecontent.com/service2006/community/CONewsDetail.asp?seq_no=270&table_id=cnews2&menu_no=1&startPage=21&pageNo=30.
- Kim, K.-b. (2006) Munhwa wonhyeong-eui gaeyeom-gwa hwalyong [The concept and its applicaiton of culture archetype], *Inmun Kontents [Human Contents]*, 6: 7-22.
- Kim, K.-d. (2005) Munhwa wonhyeong digital kontents saeop-eui sahoejeok hyoyong [Social utility of digital culture archetype project], *Inmun Kontents [Human Contents]*, 5: 7-28.
- Kim, P.-j. (2000) Jeonhwangi hanguk jisikjeongchaek-eui hyeonjuso: Sinjisikinron-gwa BK21saeop-eul jungsim-euro [The status of the Korean knowledge policy in the transitional period], *Gyeongje-wa Sahoe [Economy and Society]*, 46: 261-290.
- KOCCA (2009) *Munhwa wonhyeong chongram [Culture archetype contents catalog]*, Seoul: KOCCA.
- McGuigan, J. (2004) *Rethinking cultural policy*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- MCT (2000) *Munhwa saneop bijeon 21: Munhwa saneop jinheung ogaeyeon gyehoek [Cultural industry vision 21: Five-year plan for cultural industry promotion]*, Seoul: MCT.
- MCT (2001) *Kontents Korea bijeon 21: Munhwa kontents saneop baljeon chujin gyehoek [Content Korea vision 21: Action plan for the development of culture content industries]*, Seoul: MCT.
- MCT (2002) *2002 munhwa saneop baekseo [2002 Cultural industry white paper]*, Seoul: MCT.

- MCT (2005) *Munhwa gangguk C-Korea 2010 [Culture power C-Korea 2010]*, Seoul: MCT.
- MCT (2006) *2005 munhwa saneop baekseo [2005 Cultural industry white paper]*, Seoul: MCT.
- MCT. (2007) *2006 munhwa saneop baekseo [2006 Cultural industry white paper]*. Seoul: MCT.
- MCT and KOCCA (2005) *CT bijeon mit rodmaep [CT vision and roadmap]*, Seoul: MCT.
- Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990) Governing economic life, *Economy and society*, 19: 1-31.
- Mitchell, T. (1999) Society, economy, and the state effect, in G. Steinmetz (ed.) *State/culture: State-formation after the cultural turn*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mitchell, T. (2008) Rethinking economy, *Geoforum*, 39: 1116-1121.
- OECD (1998) Content as a new growth industry, *OECD digital economy papers*, OECD.
- Pempel, T.J. (1999) The developmental regime in a changing world economy, in M. Woo-Cumings (ed.) *The developmental state*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rose, N. and Miller, P. (1992) Political power beyond the state: Problematics of government, *British Journal of Sociology*, 43: 173-205.
- Ryu, J.-a. (2007) *Munhwa wonhyeong dijiteol kontents projekt [Culture Archetype Digital Content Project]*, Available at: <http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=005762&pageFlag>.
- Ryu, S.-h. (2005) *Munhwa kontents-eui eowon-gwa gaenyeom hyeongseong-e daehan hoego [Recollection on the origin and formation of the concept of culture content]*, Available at: <http://ct.kaist.ac.kr/en/board/read.php?bid=48&pid=367&page=1&ord=1>.
- Shim, S.-M. (2003) Kontents-e maehok-doen yeonghon, ggum-gwa hyunsil sai [Emerging power, digital content industry], *Inmun Kontents [Human Contents]*, 1: 170-203.
- Wade, R. (1992) *Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in east Asian industrialization*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Woo-Cumings, M. (1999) Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the politics of nationalism and development, in M. Woo-Cumings (ed.) *The developmental state*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- World Bank (2000) Republic of Korea: Transition to a knowledge-based economy, World Bank.
- Yim, H. (2002) Cultural identity and cultural policy in South Korea, *The International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 8: 37-48.
- Yim, H. (2005) *Developing policies for nurturing human resources in cultural industries in Korea*. Available at: <http://www.unescobkk.org/culture/our-projects/cultural-industries-and-creative-enterprises/cultural-industries-in-asia-and-the-pacific/senior-expert-symposium-on-cultural-industries/symposium-documents/>.
- Yúdice, G. (2003) *The expediency of culture: Uses of culture in the global era*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

ⁱ I will focus on Peter Evans's work (1995), which represents a more advanced and sophisticated version of work in the developmental state theoretical paradigm.

ⁱⁱ Paired with the term "content," the term OSMU has been especially popular in the cultural industries and the media in Korea and does not seem much used outside of Korea.