Introduction

Over the past several decades, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has gained notoriety due to its systematic breaches of basic human rights. It continues to suffer from on-going food crises – the most severe famine occurring in the mid-1990s, killing approximately one million North Koreans.[i] Although substantial humanitarian assistance came from organisations such as the World Food Program and countries including the United States, South Korea and Japan, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans continue to cross into neighboring China in search of food and temporary employment.

Of these states, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) has been the most generous in terms of aid to the North: since 1995, the South Korean government has spent approximately USD$3 billion.[ii] In addition to this figure, in the last five years the government spent nearly USD$183 million for North Korean refugees living within South Korea. This aid was inclusive of settlement packages for refugees and their families; primary, middle, high school and college tuition fees; and monetary incentives for South Korean employers to encourage the hiring of refugees.

Despite these forms of generous aid however, a noticeable shift began to materialize in 2005. South Korea significantly reduced settlement packages by more than two-thirds, and the once-fraternal sentiment extended to defectors began to dissipate. Many scholars have explored reasons for the modification in monetary and social support, and cite financial disincentives and a changed security landscape (such as the end of the Cold War) as instigators of attitudinal change in South Korea. Whilst each of these explanations are of relevance and interest, they fail to consider the underlying transformation of the South Korean citizenry and its government. A more tenable explanation for this change, it is argued here, is the gradual process of re-identification, ultimately affecting the sentiment and public policy towards defectors.

The processes of re-identification have already occurred on the Korean peninsula. The end of the Korean War resulted in the partitioning of Korea into two states with ideologically opposing governments, each with their own agenda of identifying "Korean-ness." For example, both North and South Korea refer to themselves as the one, 'true' Korea; yet use different words to describe this state. North Korea calls itself *chosun* and its people *chosunsaram,* whilst South Korea calls itself *daehanminguk* and its people *hanguksaram*.[iii] This categorization serves as one of many markers of a subtle differentiation of identity between North and South Koreans. This paper explores this differentiation of identity, how it has evolved, and more specifically, how it has reconstructed the notion of Self and Others, from a South Korean perspective.

Given the multi-dimensional security issues and other complexities surrounding the Korean peninsula, the intention of this paper is to focus on the particular issue of defectors in South Korea, and to become cognizant of the reasons as to why once generous policies towards defectors have shifted so significantly over the past several years. Put differently, it asks, "Why are these changes taking place, and what is the nature of this change? How can this phenomenon best be explained?"

This paper will investigate these questions by exploring theories of identity. It posits that a changing position of identity, or what Alexander Wendt refers to as 'identification,' continues to take place on the Korean peninsula. This is most evident in the way in which contemporary South Korea has socially constructed the definition of itself, effectively manipulating a new sense of identity that is vastly different to the North *vis-à-vis* defectors. In this regard, the emergence of new norms serves as the impetus for the reconfiguration of identity.[iv]

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, it will illustrate the particular policy and behavioral changes *vis-à-vis* defectors that have occurred over the past five years. Second, it will identify how existing literature has attempted to explain this shift. Third, it will demonstrate why these explanations are insufficient, and will suggest a more plausible theoretical framework that better explains this phenomenon, as found in the scholarly constructivist and post-modernist literature of norms and the social construction of identity. Finally, it will apply this theoretical framework to investigate the *raison d'être* for the modern fragmentation of the Korean peninsula, situated in the context of the differential treatment of North Korean refugees. It is not the intention of this paper to suggest that this framework is the *only* explanation. Rather, it proposes that more thoughtful consideration should be extended to the processes of re-identification when undertaking an analysis of changes to ROK policy

and behavior. I argue that this phenomenon cannot fully be explained without taking into account identity factors, which contributes to filling the gap in scholarship pertaining to ROK identification *vis-à-vis* defectors.

Understanding the Situation

Initial South Korean policies

The number of defectors seeking asylum in South Korea has increased exponentially since the North Korean famine in the mid-1990s. The ROK Ministry of Unification (MOU) has published statistics indicating a total of approximately 100 North Korean refugees *pre*-1994, whilst current figures indicate over 9,000.[v] The ROK policy extended towards DPRK refugees appeared as one that was inherently guided by notions of obligations beyond territorial borders. It was a policy that stated the importance of kinship, shared culture and history, and one that emphasized the extension of kindness and sympathy to North Koreans.

The first expression of South Korean generosity was financial. Under the Kim Dae Jung administration from 1997 to 2004, the MOU provided a $32,000 resettlement stipend (*jeongchakkeum*) to those North Koreans who had undergone proper resettlement processes.[vi] This lump-sum payment was envisioned to create a positive social environment under which defectors could learn to independently adapt to their new liberal democratic society. In addition to the *jeongchakkeum*, monetary assistance was provided in the form of free medical coverage (inclusive of dental, physical and psychological coverage), free primary and secondary education, subsidies to higher education tuition, and monetary incentives to businesses and workplaces for the hiring of defectors.[vii] Defectors were also given housing stipends, or offered rent-controlled apartments owned by the government, to assist with the competitive housing market often faced by Seoul residents.[viii]

Secondly, Seoul developed the *Hanawon* centre (literally translating to "one-ness"), with its sole purpose being to provide refugees with educational and cultural adaptation lessons.[ix] This settlement support facility opened on July 8, 1999, and incorporates three main programs: psychological and emotional counseling; cultural adaptation (such as Korean language lessons, as the Northern dialect differs quite dramatically from the Southern dialect); and finally, job training and career guidance and support.[x] Operated mainly by NGO volunteers and state social service employees, *Hanawon* eventually expanded to include the building of two more centres, located in the Ansung and Kyonggi provinces.[xi]

Finally, the ROK government provided newly settled defectors with security officers, whose primary responsibility was offering protection and assistance.[xii] The underlying impetus for establishing the role of security officers was not only to generate an environment that was safe and welcoming, but also to offer additional support to assist in their transition and resettlement. Security officers provided traditional measures of security, and were responsible for delivering "professional guidance," medical assistance and counseling support.[xiii]

As these policies indicate, South Korea offered a wide range of support services to North Korean defectors, emphasizing the importance of social welfare and integration. Political policies reflected thoughtful consideration towards defectors, and demonstrated ROK's awareness of the benefits of such programs in alleviating the difficulties of transition for defectors. Further, it indicated a willingness to provide for the North Koreans living *within* their borders. During this early period, government rhetoric and policy was generally aligned in its generous and fraternal disposition to defectors.

Current South Korean policy

Two key changes have occurred over the past several years: adjustments to financial assistance policies for defectors; and shifts in the functional purpose of cultural assimilation programs.

The *jeongchakkeum* offered to defectors has significantly decreased. Whilst pre-2005 payments were allotted at $32,000, post-2005 payments of the *jeongchakkeum* have been reduced to $9,000.[xiv] Additionally, payments are now dispersed via separate installments: $2,800 in the first year, and $6,500 over the following two years.[xv] Lankov argues that the installment payments were introduced in order to reduce the number of refugees seeking asylum in South Korea. He writes,

Indeed, the aid packages paid in the pre-2005 period were large enough to make 'chain defections'[xvi] easy... The dramatic cut in the amount of the lump sum in 2005 made this far more difficult and indeed resulted in fewer defections. In all probability, this was exactly its purpose.[xvii]

Moreover, monetary rewards for valuable information regarding North Korea have significantly decreased.[xviii] Initially protected under the Presidential Executive Order No. 15436, the guidelines stated that defectors were entitled to "information money" in addition to the *jeongchakkeum* they receive.[xix] Since 1998 however, little reward money has been publicized, which may in part be explained by the accumulated data already gathered by the ROK government, or perhaps is simply an extension of the newer policies that serve to deter defectors from seeking refuge in the South.

The second noticeable change is evident in "cultural assimilation" programs. Although still operating, programs such as *Hanawon* have moved away from a "protection" and "support" framework to one that values independent assimilation. Since 2005, yearlong programs have been reduced to two months, providing little time for defectors to readjust to their new environment.[xx] Whilst some might argue that such programs should operate under voluntary participation laws (as opposed to mandatory participation), the length in the reduction of the program is not a result of South Korea's moral commitment to "choice" and "freedom" for refugees, but rather a decision that seems grounded in financial costs.[xxi] Government assistance in the form of employment initiatives has also declined. The government implemented an "affirmative action" employment plan to provide defectors (many of whom have little or no educational backgrounds) the opportunity for skillful employment. Subsidizing defector salaries by more than 50%, the ROK government guaranteed employment to defectors under the 1993 Protective Law.[xxii] However, despite their benefits, this type of employment incentive program is not without costs. Many defectors have few skills that are desired in the contemporary job market in South Korea. The employment opportunities for defectors are limited and tend to be categorized as "3D" – that is, dirty, dangerous and difficult.[xxiii] Understandably, many defectors are unwilling or find little satisfaction in taking on these positions, and with the lower wages received for manual labor occupations, defectors must once again rely on the state welfare system in order to provide for themselves and their families. This paradoxically widens the social hierarchy between defectors who are trying to adjust in an extremely homogeneous society, and South Koreans who view refugees as social burdens.

By prioritizing the financial and strategic goals of South Korea, recent ROK policy essentially reflects one that has developed out of concern for the difficulties inherent in political integration and against the backdrop of the costs to reunification, whilst at the same time being aware of the changing political circumstances.

Explanations For These Changes

We have seen that once generous assistance towards defectors has evolved into a reduction in aid and support. While this description of the policies of 'then' and 'now' helps to identify the nature of the positional transformations, it fails to explain *why* this change has transpired. There have, however, been a number of suggestions as to why this reversal has taken place. Of these, two of the most widely cited are considered here.

The first explanation is primarily financial. The series of poor economic policy decisions that triggered the Great Famine not only highlighted the emerging humanitarian crisis, it accentuated the costly potentialities of reunification—which the ROK government recognized as precarious to their growing economy. In spite of the Asian economic crisis of 1997, its real per capita growth has averaged over 6%—this, along with their impressive political development has lead to South Korea's reputation as "*the* premier global success story of the past half century."[xxiv] The desire to consolidate these economic gains then becomes a disincentive to pursuing a unification agenda.

Given this period of prosperity and alongside it a growing body of literature predicting the high costs of reunification,[xxv] South Korea advocated less for reunification and more strongly for peaceful engagement and cooperation as advocated by Kim's Sunshine Policy. The economic lessons learned from the reunification of East and West Germany has been influential within policy circles in the ROK government.[xxvi] Kwak Tae Hwan and Joo Seung Ho maintain that refugee policy is merely an extension of this greater economic concern, and claim that without the absorption of a market economy or economic reform in the North, South Korea would

inevitably bear the costs of reunification—which some estimate at $1.2 billion.[xxvii] Fearing that continued generosity towards incoming North Koreans might spark a sizeable increase in the number of asylum seekers, the ROK government began to operate less on fraternal motivations and more on concerns that prioritized its material and financial position. In this context, when faced with the prospect of providing for 20 million potential refugees, South Korea's growing reservations are understandable.

However, in spite of the seemingly high costs of providing continued aid and support for defectors in South Korea and the traumatizing economic concerns that may have arisen due to the 1997 economic crisis,[xxviii] it is important to note that although the number of defectors have increased quite substantially, it is crucial to keep the number in perspective. Between 1949 and 1961, there were over 210,000 East German refugees seeking asylum in West Germany.[xxix] That number more than doubled between 1962 and 1988, with another 562,261 East German refugees (or an average of approximately 21,000 annually).[xxx] "Clearly," Lankov posits, "A full-blown collapse of North Korea could result in a dramatic increase in defections, but to date that possibility appears remote and the overall numbers remain very small."[xxxi]

The second explanation centers on the changing nature of refugee policy embodied in the transformation of securitization principles on the peninsula. Before the end of the Cold War, defectors were welcomed in the South and were often used as instruments of propaganda. As Lankov states, "incessant propaganda campaigns were waged to encourage even more defections."[xxxii] The utility of defectors played a significant role in how they were perceived, and explain in part the impetus for the generous financial allowances. The end of the Cold War truncated the South's urgent need for information regarding the North, resulting in "a decline in the status, importance and attention paid to North Korean defectors."[xxxiii] Essentially, as the South's need for defectors declined, so too did the monetary incentives given to them.

Having acknowledged this point, however, it is not obvious why information about the North should have been less valuable. In some ways, one could argue that the threat has increased, not decreased. For example, North Korea's military capabilities dramatically increased in the 1990s, in particular with the acquisition and tests of missiles and nuclear weapons. Moreover, as details of the extreme famine leaked out, the existence of new dangers emerged in the form of threats to human security. Ultimately, while the ideological battle of the Cold War may have ended, the changing security landscape simply brought about a new set of concerns on the Korean peninsula. Additionally, this explanation only addresses part of the issue. As politically 'useful' defectors only accounted for a minority of the total North Korean refugee flow to begin with, this account is unable to explain the changing behavior and policies towards defectors. That is, even at the onset of the refugee crisis, defectors armed with any politically sensitive information regarding the North were few and far in between. So whilst this position might explain a growing lack of interest in defectors with the onset of the end of the Cold War and changed security values, it does not explain the transitioning lack of sympathy for defectors in general.

These explanations offer insight into conceptualizing and interpreting the reasons for changed policies towards defectors. However, none of these factors can *comprehensively* explain why policies have changed, nor are they the most fruitful avenues for understanding the revised position of South Korea. To this end, an alternative account of individuation, norms, and re-identification may serve as a more plausible explanation to understanding the nature of this change. The following section discusses the function of norms and identity, how they become engrained within decision-making processes of states, and ultimately, how actors and collective communities socialize (or *diffuse*) norms to reconstruct their identities.

Norms, Ideas and Interests in Identity Formation

At its core, constructivism is concerned with "the issue of human consciousness,"[xxxiv] or the centrality of the role of interests, ideas and identities. Constructivists argue that social meanings, interpretations, and realities are constructed through interactions, effectively creating the functional mechanisms of norms, interests, ideas and identities, which collectively serve to guide the behavior and actions of actors.[xxxv] Essentially, it is

> characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures.[xxxvi]

In other words, they maintain that ideas, not singularly material or institutional factors, shape the behavior and interests of actors and states in international relations.[xxxvii] As a result, interactions between actors and states constitute not only what actors and states *want*, but also help to identify who they *are*, ultimately envisioning conceptions of Self and Other. [xxxviii] Identities are contingent upon intersubjective interactions, or what sociologists refer to as "symbolic interactionism."[xxxix] Consequently, identities are constituted by domestic and international structures. What this reveals is that identities are not exogenous or fixed, but rather, varied ontological "entities" that are acquired by way of "socializations"[xl] through social relationships. [xli] Because constructivism asserts the significance of understanding interest formation (which in turn is crucial to understanding a broad spectrum of political dynamics and peculiarities) a constructivist framework allows for a deeper analysis of particular policies and sentiment adopted by actors that are guided by intersubjective structures that affect the intrinsic identities of actors. Essentially, it is a theoretical framework that takes into consideration the processes of social interaction that the main analytical perspectives of IR, neorealism and neoliberalism, fail to consider.

The construction of national identities is malleable and unfixed. Because of its capacity to determine 'insiders' and 'outsiders,' national identities are variable, given the plasticity of the notion of "nation," and the many markers that serve to designate the differences between "us" and "them."[xlii] Ultimately, the existence of nations (and consequently, national identities) presupposes the idea that other nations and communities exist, hence its desire to distinguish itself and construct a national identity that establishes who belongs and who does not. Before exploring the use of markers in the construction of national identity, a brief discussion of "nation" and "nationalism" is essential.

"A nation is a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."[xliii] To this end, it is a psychological bond that unites members of a nation together, constituting the "essence of national identity"[xliv] or "a sense of belonging."[xlv] This bond indicates the interconnectedness of individuals and the nation state, a marriage that results in the social phenomenon of nationalism. Nationalism is "the ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation."[xlvi] In essence, a national identity is reliant upon the existence of a national community set against the backdrop of other national communities. As such, the imagined national identity is a socially constructed, fluid concept that uses markers to cognitively realize itself.

In their article "The National State and Identity Politics," Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes identify five common markers that members rely on to afford their national identity: blood, language, culture, religion and citizenship.[xlvii] Whilst not an extensive list, Mansbach and Rhodes contend that this is the most "reasonable starting place" for beginning to understand how national identity is constructed.[xlviii] As a social construct, the likelihood that markers will vary in relative importance between and amongst national members is anticipated: "The relative importance of markers may depend on the particular context within which nation is evoked or on conversational primers."[xlix] In other words, given a particular social situation or period, a nation may place more significance of a certain marker, such as common language, over another, such as political membership. For example, the security landscape on the Korean peninsula during the Cold War was highly sensitive: South Korea went so far as to establish the National Security Act whereby communicating in any way with North Koreans was considered not only illegal, but treacherous. The marker of political organization (communism versus capitalism) guided the national identity of South Koreans at the time: "we" are *not* communist—therefore, "they" are not "us." Whilst the marker of political organization may still prevail, it is not as significant as it once was. It could be argued that in contemporary South Korea, markers such as culture and language are more salient to national identity.

As we shall see, the significance of markers not only lies in their ability to construct national identities, it emphasizes the fundamental capacity for creating barriers to inclusion. Mansbach and Rhodes explain:

> Blood is difficult to change, except by redefining foundation myths to widen or narrow inclusiveness. Language, by contrast, is relatively easy to acquire. Culture can be acquired but with more difficulty. Religion not only can be acquired but, significantly, it can be falsely claimed or shammed. Citizenship can be granted or withheld (and even revoked) arbitrarily…This means that in a world of

transient populations, different national states face profoundly different challenges depending on what marks their particular 'we.'[l]

Perhaps most profoundly, this means that markers define the "essence" of a nation; they draw the line between the Self and Other to demonstrate the ways in which nations are more superior or attractive, ultimately affecting the behaviors of polities. The acceptance of markers that determines national identity is dependant upon social norms that regulate the importance of one marker of identity over another. In other words, social cognitions of Self (identity *vis-à-vis* markers) and social norms are mutually constitutive internalizations that "do not exist apart from each other."[li] As Wendt has astutely observed, "Identities are the basis of interests."[lii] Social norms shape the interests and preferences of actors, affecting their identity through processes of what constructivists refer to as *diffusion*, or the 'trickling down' of how norms "out there" have constitutive effects "down here."[liii]

To explain, norms are a "stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations."[liv] Risse, Ropp and Sikkink designate norms as construed actions that represent "collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity."[lv] They determine the appropriate standard of behavior for a set of actors within a collective community, and achieve compliancy when it becomes intersubjective (whereby enough actors subscribe to or accept a particular norm in order for it to have legitimate purchase), typically fulfilled via the three-stage "norm life cycle": norm emergence (*vis-à-vis* norm entrepreneurs); norm cascade (acceptance); and norm internalization (standard practice).[lvi] In other words, "norms constitute state identities and interests," albeit often in complicated ways.[lvii]

And insofar as norms designate social interests and numerous identities, identities are also constructed through difference and in relation to the Other, or as Stuart Hall posits, "The relation to what it is not."[lviii,lix] Self identity is made up of what it lacks: "Its constitution is always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles."[lx] Consider, by way of example, the manner in which George Herbert Mead describes the Self: "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process."[lxi] The essence of the Self, then, is reflexivity, whereby "the individual self is individual only because of its relation to others."[lxii] Essentially, Mead regards the development of the Self as accumulated and provisional due to its evolutionary purpose in any given period, or as he explains, shaped by "symbolic interaction." Individual acts are defined by participation with other actors. "The whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts."[lxiii] Thus, the construction of the Self and its identity is a result of the social interactions with Others, located *vis-à-vis* others.

Conceptually, the Other is situated within the context of externalities and its relationship to the Self. The positioning of the Other is traditionally considered beyond the boundaries of the Self, and therefore illustrated as a binary counterpart to the narrative of the Self. Lawrence Cahoone explains,

> A phenomenon maintains its identity…only if other units are represented as foreign or *"other"*
> through a hierarchical dualism in which the first is *privileged* or favored, and the other is
> *deprivileged* or devalued in some way. [Italics in the original].[lxiv]

In this passage, whilst Cahoone acknowledges the pejorative positioning of the Other, he also recognizes the demarcation of "in-groups" and "out-groups," or as Ivar Neumann explains, is the "*active* and ongoing part of identity formation."[lxv] Essentially, what this means is that in order to establish the notion of Self, the demarcation of the Other is a necessary component.

Images of the Self and of the Other are dynamic and in continuous motion. In some regard then, the continual flow of defectors in South Korea functions as a stimulus for enhancing and reconstructing images of the South Korean Self, ensuring solidarity amongst South Korean members, whilst at the same time enhancing the exclusion of North Korean Others. This pattern of setting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion gains further clarity when considering the processes of 'reinforced' images as discussed by Edward Said in his influential book, *Orientalism*. In it, Said argues that Others incorporate within their own self-identification the "xenostereotypes" imposed upon them.[lxvi] For Said, the function of Orientalism is not merely an "instrument of Western understanding of the Orient," but functions because it has become incorporated within the self-

understanding of the Oriental.[lxvii] Consequently, images of the Self and Other not only intersect, but also, fortify the other.

The theoretical framework discussed here provides a nexus for understanding changes towards North Korean defectors as witnessed in South Korea. Analyzing and gaining awareness of the complexities inherent within identity formation facilitates "a way of studying intersubjectively constituted structures of identities and interests that are endogamous and constitutive to the international system."[lxviii] As this section has demonstrated, constructivism allows for an exploration of the role of social norms in both the construction of (national) identity, and Self/Other conceptions, enabling us to better understand how transformations take place. It is curious, then, that processes of re-identification have been overlooked in the analysis of ROK policy towards defectors. This observation provides a starting point for the final section, which places this discussion within an empirical reality of a South Korean identity transformation.

The Re-construction of South Korean Identity

It is without a doubt that treatment of North Korean refugees in South Korea have changed. The new policies can be categorized as having undergone what Charles Taylor refers to as *individuation,* or, as Reus-Smit explains, the notion that "the modern sense of self is characterized by a profound sense of inwardness."[lxix] Taylor writes, "In our languages of self-understanding, the opposition of 'inside-outside' plays an important role. We think of our thoughts, ideas or feelings as being 'within' us, while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are 'without'."[lxx] In some way, this retraction towards nationalism and citizenry is indicative of an "inwards" inclination.

However, it is important to recognize here that while both Taylor and Reus-Smit categorize the function of individuation at an individual level, the applicability of this concept is such that it is useful to explore at a corporate, national level as well. To explain, individuation refers to a phenomenon that occurs at the level of individual consciousness—it non-subjectively underpins *self*-realization. Nevertheless, even Taylor himself acknowledges that individuation is complementary to the "whole," or what he calls "identity holism."[lxxi] Having acknowledged this point, this section explores his concept of individuation at *both* the level of the individual consciousness (South Koreans), as well as at the level of the corporate consciousness (South Korea).

Corporate individuation with reference to Other-regarding behavior and the rise of insider/outsider perceptions emerge in the context of particular normative environments. One clear example of this is apparent in the context of pre/post Korean War. Son Key Young proposes that identity norms of differentiation and subsequent re-identification emerged as a result of new normative circumstances. He explains that the perception of the North as a threat was institutionalized in the form of the National Security Law,[lxxii] which effectively suppressed any pro-North Korean movements. In spite of this political environment, however, a steady stream of early activists instigated the dissident movement.[lxxiii] These norm entrepreneurs made a major contribution to the reformulation of modern, post-democratic South Korean identity. They propagated new norms regarding North Koreans (norm emergence), which enabled a rejection of the hostile attitude that the South Korean government prescribed in the aftermath of the Korean War (cascade). This conceptualization slowly developed from one that constitutionally labeled North Koreans as enemies, to one that advocated for peace on the peninsula and championed the identity of Koreans as one and the same (internalization).

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a progressive move away from strict divisions and separate identities became clearly internalized by both North and South Korea, indicating yet another circumstance of re-identification. By 1991, the two Koreas signed an agreement on reconciliation, cooperation and nonaggression, and adopted the joint declaration of denuclearization via the 'soft' approach of the Sunshine Policy.[lxxiv] Ultimately this resulted in the first inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang in June 2000, where the two Korean leaders met for the firs time, furthering the extension of peaceful cooperation and coexistence. In fact, this period of engagement was not only evident at the corporate identity level, but was also apparent at the individual level. Kim's Sunshine Policy "strengthened those domestic groups that positively identified with North Korea, and opened the way for ordinary people to bandwagon with them."[lxxv] A transition amidst the context of this ideological warfare from defining North Koreans as enemies to friends became clear.

This period of progress is what Finnemore and Sikkink refer to as "strategic social constructivism," whereby "actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context."[lxxvi] To this end, the post-Cold War epoch brought about significant changes to security and identity politics, especially upon the Korean peninsula. "The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion in South Korea over whether to define North Korea as friend or foe."[lxxvii] South Korea effectively transitioned from imposing draconian laws banning South Koreans from engaging or contacting North Koreans to absorbing a new collective identity whereby improving bilateral relations was viewed as most imperative for mending inter-Korean relations.

Interestingly, it is in the formal environment of "engagement" that policy changes towards defectors began to take place. Whilst the end of the Cold War brought about seemingly positive changes in South/North Korean relations, the succeeding years materialized into an inception of a *new* South Korean identity. No longer were defectors seen as linguistically and ethnically homogeneous to South Koreans. In fact, the flow of refugees coming into Seoul in the mid-1990s consequently resulted in greater exposure to a group of people that were once denounced as the enemy, lessening the cloud of mystery of these long lost neighbors (see Table 1).

Gaining familiarity to the strange accents and cultural dissimilarities of defectors provided the mechanism through which a reconstruction of collective South Korean identity could take place. Under the auspices of re-identification, defectors were no longer considered as part of the *han minjok* (one Korean nation), but rather, as a group that possessed a separate national consciousness. This shift in perception is perhaps most prominently expressed through the renaming of defectors from *talbukja* (refugee) to *saeteomin* (new settlers).[lxxviii] Whilst seemingly innocuous, it is worth investigating this changing rhetoric as it still categorically separates North Koreans from South Koreans, and (possibly) more detrimentally, from North Korean *refugees* to North Korean *immigrants*. It was officially renamed in January 2005 by the MOU, and has since resulted in a number of (perhaps inadvert) consequences.

Firstly, whilst *talbukja* was specific to North Koreans, the term *saeteomin* is inclusive of immigrants (typically ethnic Chinese-Koreans) *and* refugees, ultimately categorizing "outsiders" (or non-ethnic South Koreans) altogether, and removing the suggestion of 'urgency' from the term *talbukja*. To this end, linguistically, the subtext of simplicity within the term *saeteomin* only instigates further negative connotations, stigma and social stratification.

Secondly, the re-categorization of *talbukja* to *saeteomin* undermines the discrimination many defectors face as "new settlers." In fact, many defectors prefer the term *talbukja* to *saeteomin* as it correctly labels them as refugees who need assistance and support to overcome cultural barriers, as opposed to new settlers who choose to *migrate*.[lxxix] Soo Youn concurs, stating "[North Korean defectors] think it makes them sound like opportunists rather than political refugees."[lxxx]

While such descriptors may seem rather trivial, it is where the constitution of Self/Other conceptions begins to materialize. Priorities of Self above Other transitioned via formal acceptance of the term *saeteomin*, which in turn illustrates the precedence of new identity norms of how defectors were to be viewed. However, the deeper issue is not whether one term should be used over the other, but rather that defectors are figuratively excluded from South Korean membership. The barriers to ultimate inclusion are so profound that North Koreans can never truly become part of the "we" or *essence* of South Korea. As a result, they are left to form their own community within an isolating South Korean society, forever ostracized by a people who share a common ancestry. To this end, new classes of citizens emerge, which itself has a number of both practical and theoretical implications.[lxxxi] In practice, without consideration of the importance of conflicting identities between South Korean society and *saeteomin*, assimilation of *saeteomin* into South Korean society is unlikely. In theory, issues pertaining to this new citizen category of *saeteomin* demonstrate a disparate group of citizenry and status, resulting in a divisive national Korean identity.[lxxxii]

Mechanisms of re-identification: globalization and democratization

The national division of the Korean peninsula began as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism. As such, clearly the issue of democratization in South Korea plays an important factor in shaping a new South Korean identity. Likewise, globalization has led to a number of economic reforms within South Korea, changing the dynamics and interaction between firms, businesses, citizens and the government, fundamentally facilitating a reconstruction to their collective national identity. As Kihl posits, "Interests and identities act as the

filtering mechanism through which ideas like democratization and globalization become useful and operational."[lxxxiii]

Globalization has affected ROK politics as it indirectly promoted economic reform in an effort to make their economy more competitive, progressing along "the path of modernization."[lxxxiv] It helped to transform the nation from developing state status to one that has become highly competitive in the international marketplace.[lxxxv] In search of continued prosperity then, it is clear that South Korea will be persistent in enhancing their advancement by way of continued growth, sustained involvement in areas of globalization, as well as prolonged modernization.

The forces of modernization greatly accelerated in the 1990s due to rapid changes, including the deregulation of financial markets and the advancement of technology, significantly affecting the way in which South Koreans interacted with the world.[lxxxvi] In addition to these impacts of information technology and the accumulation of greater wealth, globalization is evident by way of the movement of South Korean nationals. Ultimately, this movement and their re-inclusion into South Korean society is "bound to stoke discussion on defining national identity and political roles." That is, alternative ideas (for better or for worse) permeate into South Korean society, widening the gap between how they perceive themselves (as an advanced, more culturally aware, *modern* Korea) and their very different Northern neighbor.

As such, processes of re-identification begin to emerge and take form within these mechanisms of globalization and modernization. As more South Koreans become exposed to other cultures, the difference between North and South Korea(ns) intensifies, especially when considering the economic and political developments and the inevitable penetration of modernization experienced in the South. It is within this broad contextual framework that mechanisms of individuation are realized. Kim states that human interconnectedness and the speed with which we are able to communicate with one another has increased rapidly, "eroding the boundaries between hitherto separate economic, political and socio-cultural entities throughout the world."[lxxxvii] As a result, the pace at which identity re-formation occurs has accelerated and "constructed, destructed and reconstructed" South Korea.[lxxxviii]

Catarina Kinvall posits that globalization forces societies to question culture, resulting in the reassertion of local identities, which may prompt a great effect on cultural identities.[lxxxix] In this capacity, these changes have reformulated notions of the Self, or in other words, how South Korea advances along a path of individuation. Kim concurs, arguing that because national identity is a social construction shaped largely by geographic constraints, the "who 'we' are has often been defined by 'where' we are in the world…Contemporary globalization has a pluralizing impact on identity formation, detaching identities from particular times, places and traditions."[xc]

Ultimately, this reconstitution and processes of re-identification gives rise to multiple identities, which transform the very context within which national identities are produced.[xci] And these differences are further perpetuated by the growth of South Korean identity and culture, and the (seemingly) static nature of North Korean identity and culture. The propagation of globalization has enabled re-identification to take shape, influencing the transformation of South Korean identity from the onset of globalization in the early 1990s, to what it is today. One possible implication of the globalizing affect described here is a continued disassociation between North and South Korean identity into the future. South Korea will almost certainly become more educated, worldlier, wealthier and modern. As it does so, the common ground between North and South Korea will continue to diminish. However, at any one point in time many forces contribute to the generation of norms and identity and it is far from certain that globalization as we understand it today will be such a dominating force in the construction of identity in the future.

Additionally, democratization[xcii] serves as yet another important factor that has accentuated the processes of re-identification. It has "affected the political and socioeconomic life of the ROK in the last quarter of the twentieth century."[xciii] And while it is clear that South Korea is still undergoing changes adapting to their own system of democratization, it has, without a doubt, galvanized the state, its citizenry and their collective identity.

Certainly, while democracy means different things to different people,[xciv] the basic tenants that it exists within states, and that rights and citizenship apply only to those within those borders, has been generally accepted.[xcv] Especially when considering South Korea's transition into democratization, it is clear that this definition has been

accepted as a framework for implementation. The adoption of a modern liberal democracy in South Korea reinforced the path towards "shap[ing] contemporary Korean identity." [xcvi] Democratization enabled the differences between North and South Korean governance to arise, and it drew attention to the *value* differentiation, and consequently, behavior traits, of both North and South Koreans.

In this regard, a 2005 study by Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart helps to illustrate the relationship between democratization and citizen values. Their study found that democratization profoundly affects values embedded within political cultures, and they also observed that the values and beliefs of citizens construct the prospects and limitations for democracy. [xcvii] They suggest that democratization "increases human freedom of choice by establishing civil and political liberties," and note that along with these liberties, expression and participation are crucial to the successful implementation of democracy. [xcviii] The trajectory of South Korea's democratization serves to support Welzel and Inglehart's hypothesis that its successful implementation is a result of collective action and chorus of preferences. Ultimately this reflects upon the ability of South Korean civil society in voicing their opinions, promoting a progressive move towards democratic liberties, whilst at the same time drawing attention to the starkly different DPRK governance and citizenry. [xcix]

In particular, this culture of challenging authoritarian regimes materialized in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with activists giving rise to social pressure for freedom from authoritarian rule in South Korea. This process of liberalization, although lengthy, helped formulate the South Korean psyche—one that established the need to resist dictatorial rule and instead, develop political freedoms. This illustrates the significance of social cohesion, "liberty aspirations" and its role in successful democratization, while at the same time drawing attention to the differences between states that undergo these processes and states that do not. The development of contemporary South Korean identity and the subsequent adoption of new identity norms are accentuated by such processes of democratization, which provided the mechanism for civil society actors to contribute to the successful implementation of a new system of government.

To some extent, the modern South Korean state represents an ideological construction that was ready for political change and freedom, resulting in the evolution of a more individualistic, rights-bearing corollary. This period of activism has become deeply entrenched within their identity formation—and remains unforgotten. The 'new' era as democratized and 'free' Koreans differentiates the South immensely from the North, when considering the system within which the two Korean states exist. Thus, what results is not simply a notion of *one* Korea *but* two governments, but rather, *two* Koreas *because* of two governments.

Ultimately, the two Koreas not only progressed along different paths of development in its ideological and institutional manifestations, they stratified into two idealizations of the Korean nation. [c] For South Korea, civil society "has been deployed as a key variable in explaining political liberalization and democratic transition, and its development has been advanced as a precondition for the consolidation of democracy." [ci] It has shaped the modern South Korean conception of Self and "Korean-ness," and has formulated the new landscape of South Korean society, ultimately strengthening a new identity that embraces democratic values and a fortified civil society, as well as appreciating the effects of modernization and economic development.

From the course of these events, it is clear that the social experiences of democratization and the rise of civil society have been essential to the reassertion of new identity claims. As detailed in the previous section, social interactions can only be confirmed via "understandings and expectations about self," [cii] and significant structural change, such as democratization, occurs when "actors redefine who they are and what they want." [ciii] The events leading up to the implementation of democracy has driven and significantly facilitated the reorientation of national self-understanding, and the changes to the culture and ethics inherent within the South Korean Self.

As this section has demonstrated, identity formation and reconstruction is symptomatic of processes of new normative circumstances (such as the end of the Cold War), the utility of new labels (such as the use of *saeteomin* over *talbukja*), and the machinations of greater processes (such as globalization and democratization). Such outcomes as witnessed in South Korea have played a key role in (re)shaping a new national identity. However, given the complexities inherent within re-identification, it is important to realize that whilst these greater forces are most clearly manifest at the corporate level, they do not necessarily permeate into the consciousnesses of each and every individual. This interpretation supports the constructivist assertion that "we can ascribe beliefs to a group that are not held personally by *any* of its members, as long as members accept the legitimacy of the group's

decision and the obligation to act in accordance with its results."[civ] This paper has demonstrated the utility of constructivism in understanding the re-prioritization of Self, in addition to recognizing the way in which individuation has occurred. Although processes such as globalization and democratization may have been disambiguated within my analysis, in the "real" world, such phenomena exist simultaneously and symbiotically. As a result, this interface allows for a greater interpretation of the changes to the treatment of North Korean refugees. With the manifestation of these inceptions, 'Korean-ness' as understood by the South slowly evolved, transcending the traditional bounds of community to a new individuated community that embraced and valued their new identity.

Conclusion

Roland Bleiker contends that identity could be the key to understanding the anomalies inherent on the Korean peninsula. In particular, he draws attention to what he refers to as "the most symbolic manifestation of diverging identities,"—the treatment of North Korean defectors.[cv] This refugee crisis draws attention to the matter of identity, and it is all too important to ignore, as it has serious political and security implications for not only the Korean peninsula, but for the international community.

This paper has demonstrated the utility of constructivism in understanding processes of re-identification. The shortcomings of existing explanations, such as the inability to explain why South Korea was generous at all to begin with, can become more profound when considering the significance of norms and interests in identity formation. Such an approach potentially imparts an alterative, and perhaps more reasonable, narrative for providing an answer to the question: *Why has South Korean policy and sentiment towards North Koreans changed, and how can we best explain and understand the nature of this change?*

The implications of this study are two-fold. First, drawing attention to the issue of arising tensions (pertaining to the treatment of defectors) helps to relieve the all too common misconception that South and North Korea share a homogeneous culture and identity. Bleiker concurs, stating that this precarious fallacy "portrays the division of the peninsula as a *temporary* disruption of Korean identity," ultimately assuming that a "lost national unity" can eventually be recovered.[cvi] As a result, the reconstruction of South Korean identity is important to realize as it offers a new outlook to understanding pertinent issues. That is, the key is to appreciate this phenomenon through a more pluralistically grafted lens, such that the Other is not subsumed into the Self.[cvii] In other words, understanding why ROK policy towards North Korean refugees has changed is situated within the context of a "discourse of difference." If Self and Other conceptions are ever to be reconciled such that defectors are accepted within South Korean society, conditions must exist so that heterogeneous identities can co-exist. Grasping this "difference" enables a move towards greater cultural relativism and conceivably, unconditional acceptance. Emmanuel Levinas, for example, suggests an attempt "to develop an ethics of responsibility that refuses to hammer difference into sameness."[cviii] What results, then, is a peninsula that recognizes these differences, yet is able to subsume an articulation of identity that remains separate but harmonious.

However, it remains to be seen how this co-existence of different identities can in actuality take place. If mutual understandings of conflicting interpretations of Self and Other are to be realized, how, in the face of continued globalization, can this realistically eventuate? Especially in the midst of continued unresolved Six Party Talks, the fragile union of differences between the states, let alone a union of identity between North Korean defectors and South Koreans, remains unrealistic to anticipate. A further question that stems from this implication is whether or not progress will impinge upon the ability for South Koreans to ever accept North Koreans as part of their own. That is, how can we anticipate or predict any trajectory for complete acceptance within the South when such forces are beyond the confines of the state? Answering these questions may assist in providing solutions towards a "separate but harmonious" union of two Koreas in the future.

A second implication of this study provides a platform upon which we can better understand (and perhaps predict) how ROK strategy towards North Korea will be effected, and vice versa. Not only do changing ideologies and re-identification help to address ways to engage and cooperate with the North, it offers the theoretical premise for reconsidering the importance of norms and identity in interest formation, particularly in terms of dialogical approaches between the two Koreas. Whilst this paper may have inquired mainly on the treatment of defectors, by logical extension it is clear that the issue of reunification also be addressed. After all, it

is a highly sensitive, but ever present issue between the two states. As the processes towards successful reunification or, at the very least, open and harmonious discourse, remain a challenge, a greater awareness of re-identification allows for fair solutions "justified through a critical and self-reflective understanding of the tensions between identity and difference."[cix] However, it is crucial to note that insofar as the notion that North Korea must democratize or that South Korea should be ready and willing to absorb the North is fallacious. Given these complexities, the implications of this study provide a starting point for a broader approach to (refugee, security, reunification) policy analysis on the Korean peninsula.

[i] Marcus Noland, "Famine and Reform in North Korea," Working Paper No. 03-5, Institute for International Economics, July 2003, p. 1.

[ii] Ministry of Unification, "The Status of Humanitarian Assistance toward North Korea." Accessed on 14 February, 2008 at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/ENK/ENK0301R.jsp

[iii] Both terms discussed here, although different from one another, literally mean "Korea."

[iv] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), pp. 888.

[v] Ministry of Unification, ROK. "The Number of North Korean Defectors." Powerpoint file. Accessed 7 February 2008 at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr. White Paper on North Korean Human Rights. Korean Institute for National Unification. Seoul, Korea, 2007.

[vi] Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek, "Handling with Care: South Korean Government Policy and North Korean Defectors Living in South Korea," *Korea Observer* 30:3 (Autumn, 1999), p. 479; and Andrei Lankov, "Rejecting Northern Refugees: Part 1 – Seoul Slams the Door," *Asia Times*. Accessed 12 February 2008 at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA07Dg06.html, p. 2.

[vii] Andrei Lankov, "Rejecting Northern Refugees: Part 1," p. 2.

[viii] Jae Jean Suh, "North Korean Defectors: Their Adaptation and Resettlement," *East Asian Review* 14, 3 (2002), p. 73.

[ix] Refugees over the age of 60 are exempt from the training programs at *Hanawon*.

[x] Jae Jean Suh, "North Korean Defectors," p. 73.

[xi] Andrei Lankov, "Rejecting Northern Refugees: Part 1," p. 2.

[xii] Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek, "Handling with Care," p. 479.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste of Paradise," p. 117.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] The chain defections Lankov refers to is the process by which a "settled" family member in the South hires a broker to bring in another member of the family from the North – paying the broker with the settlement money received by the successful North Korean defector.

[xvii] Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste," p. 127.

[xviii] Andrei Lankov notes this demographic change. He writes, "Nowadays, the situation is different and the composition of defectors is starting to resemble more closely North Korean society as a whole. Out of 4,716 defectors of the period from January 2000 to August 2004, 41 percent were classified by the Ministry of Unification as "workers". A further 47 percent are described as "others," largely school students and unemployed housewives. Only 3 percent are described as "professionals", 3 percent as "managers" (including party cadres) and 2 percent as "sportsmen, artists, and entertainers." Of the remaining, 5 percent are made up of "service workers" and 0.7 percent are ex-soldiers" (Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste," p. 56; and Ministry of Unification, Settlement Support Division). Therefore, as Lankov posits, even by generous estimates, less than ten percent of recent North Korean refugees arriving in South Korea belong to the "elite" or educated middle classes, which he attributes to the risks and difficulties of seeking asylum through China.

[xix] Ministry of Unification, ROK, *Kukhe gamsa bogosuh, jechul jaryo*, #2148 (2006). Accessed on 7 February 2008 at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/kr /KCO/KCO0200L.jsp.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek, "Handling with Care," p. 479.

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Dong Soon Seol and Geon Soon Han, "Foreign Migrant Workers and Social Discrimination in Korea," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* Winter (2004), p. 45. These jobs typically include working in "fields such as dyeing, plating, heat-treat, casting and tempering, machinery, footwear, glass, leather, electricity, electronics factories and construction."

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] See Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-Gang Liu, *The Costs and Benefits of Korean Reunification,* Institute for International Economics Working Paper 98-1 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998); Roland Bleiker, "Psychological Difficulties of German Unification: Implications for Korea," *Korea Observer*, 34:2 (2003), pp. 403-

16; Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung Ho Joo, "The Korean Peace Process: Problems and Prospects After the Summit," *World Affairs* 162 (Fall, 2002), pp. 79-90; David Kelleher, Hak-Min Kim, "Post-unification Privatisation of North Korean Enterprises: Lessons from Transition Economies," *Korea Observer* 36:1 (2005), pp. 31-40; Youngho Kim, "The Great Powers in Peaceful Korean Reunification," *International Journal on World Peace* 20:3 (2003), pp. 11-17; and Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste of Paradise," p. 132-133.

xxvi According to Andrew McCarthy, "Even the Germans have warned against rapid steps to unify the two Koreas. In its 400 page report, the German Institute for Economic Research asserted that the overall cost of Korean reunification could be as high as 10 percent of South Korea's GDP, twice the burden born by West Germany." Andrew McCarthy, "German Unification: An Unlikely Model for Korea," April 9, 1997, as cited in Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste," p. 131.

xxvii Marcus Noland, "Political Economy of North Korea: Historical Background and Present Situation," In American Enterprise Institute, *A New International Engagement Framework for North Korea?* Interview with Professor Hwang in *Chosun Ilbo*, July 28, 2005.

xxviii The Asian financial crisis will be further discussed later in Chapter 3.

xxix Andrei Lankov, "Bitter Taste," p. 54.

xxx Ibid.

xxxi Ibid.

xxxii Ibid.

xxxiii Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek, "Handling with Care," pp. 477-8.

xxxiv John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 33.

xxxv Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3:3 (1997), p. 319.

xxxvi Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism." In Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devatak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True's (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd edition, pp. 188-212 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 188. For an excellent summary of constructivism, see also Christian Reus-Smit, "Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4:3 (2002), pp. 487-509.

xxxvii Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 92-138.

xxxviii Ibid, p. 231.

xxxix This term derives from the work of George Herbert Mead, who has argued that the identity of the self is simply a product of social interactions, serving purposive and creative purposes. Put simply, he asserted: "Society shapes self shapes social behavior." (*See* Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke, "The Past, Present and Future of an Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63:4 (2000), p. 285.) Coined by Herbert Blumer, symbolic interactionism claims three premises: "1. Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things; 2. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others and the society; 3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he/she encounters." (*See* Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 2.)

xl Wendt describes "socializations" as "a process of learning to conform one's behavior to societal expectations." He goes on to say that it is a "process of identity- and interest-formation, which in the long run individualists can hardly afford to ignore." Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory*, p. 170.

xli Ibid, pp. 224-6, and p. 243.

xlii Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, "The National State and Identity Politics: State Institutionalisation and 'Markers' of National Identity," *Geopolitics* 12 (2007), p. 444.

xliii Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p.14.

xliv Anna Triandafyllidou, "National Identity and the 'Other,'" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21:4 (1998), p. 595.

xlv Wayne Connor, "A Nation is a Nation," p. 387.

xlvi Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, p. 73.

xlvii These markers essentially refer to the overlapping of: a common descent (blood), a shared language, shared religion, shared cultural norms and institutions (culture), and a shared political belief and/or attachments (citizenship). Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, "The National State and Identity Politics," p. 444.

xlviii Ibid.

xlix Ibid.

l Ibid, p. 447.

li Ibid.

lii Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," *International Organization* 46:2 (1992), p. 398.

liii Jeffrey Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), p. 85.

[liv] James March and Johan Olson, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), p. 948.

[lv] Thomas Risse, Steven Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights*, p. 236.

[lvi] For a detailed review of the norm life cycle and its three stages, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," p. 891. For the origination of international norms and an analysis of how they have been constructed, see Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40:3 (1996), pp. 363-389.

[lvii] Christian Reus-Smit, "Imagining Society," pp. 493-4.

[lviii] Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p.4.

[lix] Ibid.

[lx] Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York: Verso Publishing, 1990), p. 33.

[lxi] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 135.

[lxii] Lewis A. Coser, *Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context*, 2nd edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 338.

[lxiii] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 7.

[lxiv] Lawrence Cahoone, "Introduction." In L. Cahoone (ed.) *From Modernism to Post-Modernism: An Anthology*, pp. 1-13, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 11.

[lxv] Ivar Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 4.

[lxvi] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

[lxvii] Ibid. See also Bo Strath, "A European Identity," pp. 395-6.

[lxviii] Ivar Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, p. 37.

[lxix] Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)*, pp. 125-6.

[lxx] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, p. 111, as cited in Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, p. 126.

[lxxi] Charles Taylor, "Living with Difference." In Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr. (eds.) *Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 216.

[lxxii] The National Security Law was enacted on December 1, 1948, and revised again in 1949, 1950 and 1958. It was a legal measure that sought to "restrict anti-state acts that endanger national security and to protect the nation's safety and its people's life and freedom." Later in the 1980s, the National Security Law was amended to include the Anti-Communism Law, and the law continues (albeit amongst some protest) to exist today. See Son Key Young, "Entrenching Identity Norms," p. 500.

[lxxiii] Son Key Young, "Entrenching Identity Norms," p. 500.

[lxxiv] In spite of failing to implement both of these agreements, however, this move towards exchange between the two "enemy" states indicated a great leap towards reunification. See Young Whan Khil, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture* (London: M.E. Sharpe Publications, 2005), pp. 228-265.

[lxxv] Son Key Young, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 4.

[lxxvi] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," p. 888.

[lxxvii] Son Key Young, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea*, p. 4.

[lxxviii] Literally, this translates as: "*sae*" meaning "new", "*teo*" meaning "place", and "*min*" referring to a person. Officially, then, "saeteomin" translates to "one who has hope about life in a new place". Source: SBS News, "Government to Formerly Address 'Talbukja' as 'Saeteomin'." Accessed on 10 May 2008, from: http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&si d1=100&oid=055&aid=0000036115.

[lxxix] Interview with Edward Yoon, a North Korean refugee; See also Romee Lee, "Locating 'Refugees' in the 'Elite' Place: Analysis of Experiences of North Korean Defectors in South Korean Universities." Accessed on 1 June, 2008 at: http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/CASAE/cnf2008/OnlineProceedings-2008/CAS2008-Lee.pdf.

[lxxx] Soo Youn, "Behind the Bamboo Curtain," *Audrey Magazine*, December 2007. Accessed on 14 May 2008, at: http://news.newamericamedia.org/news /view_article.html?article_id=cb974ef5f9b3c2c31 a42f0d684a84d7c

[lxxxi] *See* Jih Un Kim and Dong Jin Jang, "Aliens Among Brothers? The Status and Perception of North Korean Refugees in South Korea," *Asian Perspective* 32:2 (2007), pp. 5-22.

[lxxxii] Ibid.

[lxxxiii] Young Whan Khil, *Transforming Korean Politics,* p. 236.

[lxxxiv] Ibid, p. 22.

[lxxxv] Ibid, p. 212; *See also* Samuel S. Kim, *East Asia and Globalization*.

[lxxxvi] According to the Ministry of Information and Communication, by 2007, over 79 percent of households in South Korea had broadband Internet (compared to 42 percent in 2000). Weighed against Australia, Japan, the US and the UK,

South Korea had the highest percentage of broadband subscribers per 100 in 2006 (29.27 percent, compared to 19.15, 20.62, 19.31 and 21.71 percent, respectively). This growth in information technology indicates a perpetuation alternative ideas and exploration into further paths for development. Internet Statistics Information System, "IT Statistics by Country." National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA), accessed on 1 May 2008, from: http://isis.nida.or.kr/eng/

[lxxxvii] Ibid, p. 12.

[lxxxviii] Ibid.

[lxxxix] Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology* 25:5 (2004), p. 741.

[xc] Samuel Kim, "Korea's Democratization," p. 12.

[xci] David Held *et al., Global Transformations*, p. 328-375.

[xcii] Prior to the modern existence of South Korean democracy, or the Sixth Republic as it is known, the state experienced three failed "junctures" of democratization: the first juncture took place from 1956-1961, which lasted until the April 1960 Student Revolution (overthrowing the government in order to usher in the second wave of democracy); the second juncture took place been 1973-1980, which "failed to bring about political change toward full democracy…due to authoritarian repression led by the military juntas," culminating into the third democratic juncture, which took place between 1984-1987. This paper acknowledges these historic attempts to democratize, however, will focus primarily on the era of the Sixth Republic, or since the presidential election of Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) to the incumbent President Lee Myung Bak (2008-). (See Young Whan Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics*, pp. 7-9.)

[xciii] Ibid, p. 65.

[xciv] Doh Chull Shin, "Mass Politics, Public Opinion and Democracy in Korea." In Samuel Kim (ed.) *Korea's Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 50. *See also* Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger, "Conceptions of Democracy Among Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 27 (1997), pp. 157-90.

[xcv] David Held *et al., Global Transformations*, 1999.

[xcvi] Roland Bleiker, *A Divided Korea*, p. 12.

[xcvii] Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom," *International Review of Sociology* 15:1 (2005), pp. 84-5. For a further discussion on the relationship between values and democracy, see Ronald Inglehart, "Culture and Democracy." In Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington's (eds) *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.

[xcviii] Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom," p. 85.

[xcix] Whilst the use of the term "civil society" simplifies the complexities of their role in participating in the process of democratizing South Korea in the late 1980s, it is important to note that not all civil society members and organizations were supportive of the move towards democratization. It is not the intention of this research paper to ignore the role of other civil society organizations that contributed to supporting the incumbent authoritarian leadership of Syngman Rhee; however, a proper discussion of these historically important groups require more space than I am allowed. For a critical analysis of the relationship between civil society and democratization, see Muthiah Alagappa, *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 478-482. And for detailed discussion of the role of differing civil society groups during the democratizing process in South Korea in particular, see Sunhyuk Kim, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Su Hoon Lee, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society," *Pacific Affairs* 66 (1993), pp. 351-367; Samuel S. Kim, ed., *Korea's Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jang Jip Choi, "Democratization, Civil Society and the Civil Social Movement in Korea: The Significance of the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election," *Korea Journal* 40:3 (2000), pp. 26-57; and Charles Armstrong, ed., *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State* (London: Routledge Publishing, 2002).

[c] Ibid, p. 334. Also, for an excellent discussion of *minjok* and democracy, see Henry Em, "Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch'aeho's Historioraphy." In Shin and Robinson (eds.) *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 336–61.

[ci] Muthiah Alagappa, "Civil Society and Democratic Change," p. 478.

[cii] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy," p. 397.

[ciii] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 336-7.

[civ] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 162-3 (emphasis in the original).

[cv] Roland Bleiker, *A Divided Korea,* p. xxxi.

[cvi] Ibid (italics added).

[cvii] Bleiker supports this position, stating that the "differences between the two Koreas are too deeply rooted to be merged into one common form of identity, at least in the near future." (Roland Bleiker, *A Divided Korea*, p. 110.)

[cviii] Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), as cited in Bleiker, p. 99.

[cix] Roland Bleiker, *A Divided Korea,* p. 110.