

Rudiger Frank

Humboldt-University Berlin, Korea Institute

The Culture of Korean Regulation. Licensing for IMT-2000

presentation at

The First World Congress of Korean Studies

Songnam (Seongnam), July 18-20, 2002

1. Regulatory Tradition in Korea

Every state interacts with its citizens in a way which is heavily determined by cultural preferences and prerogatives. Korea is not and has never been an exception. To assess these sources of regulatory and administrative tradition, I identify three major factors of influence:

- ◆ the mostly neo-Confucian tradition
- ◆ the Japanese example during the colonial period
- ◆ the influx of "Western", predominantly US-American ideas and concepts

In Korea, there has developed a unique regulatory culture as a result of the interaction of these three factors. It is important to understand this complicated set of values, structures and behavioral patterns before trying to analyze the outcomes of the regulatory process.

Neo-Confucian Tradition: For many centuries, there existed a bureaucracy consisting of a well-trained elite of professionals with high self-esteem. The decision-making process was strictly top-down; the bureaucratic rule was usually strong, centralized and relatively uncontested (Henderson 1978, Deuchler 1992). However, the ruling elite had to fulfill a number of duties against the citizens. The relationship between the rulers and the ruled – or

at least its ideal form – was very much of a bi-directional nature. That included a strong sense of paternal responsibility on the side of the bureaucrats, and the understanding on the side of the citizens that the strict obedience they were required to show had to be rewarded with good government. The definitions of "good government" varied over time and from interest group to interest group, as did the potential to challenge the performance of the administration. But in principle, the idea of the "mandate of heaven" was very strong. It is important to note that the current system of merit-based recruiting of public officials reflects the Neo-Confucian ideal much more than the increasingly corrupt system did in the last Korean dynasty.

The public officials are the main cause for the descent of Korea and the enormous misery in that country. Their grief has stifled all striving for profit and property, all motivation to work, and all industries. There hardly exists a place in this world in which people work less than in Seoul.


(Hesse-Wartegg, Ernst von [1895]: Korea. Eine Sommerreise nach dem Land der Morgenruhe 1894, Dresden und Leipzig: Carl Reissner, p. 57)

Japanese Example: The cultural foundations for the Japanese administrative system were surely not the same as in Korea, but they were much closer to it than the various "Western" models. It is therefore no surprise that the 35 years of colonial rule plus over 30 years of influence since the Kanghai Treaty have significantly influenced Korea's administrative culture. This is even more the case since many structures of a "modern" (again in the Western sense) state have been introduced during that time. One of the major lessons was that a strong and independent state needs a strong economy and a strong military. Korean entrepreneurs learned that being close to the state was a precondition for success, especially since most of them were excluded from such privileges (see McNamara 1990). The Koreans witnessed a symbiosis of the state and the big businesses, with the Zaibatsu being the agents of the state and helping him to realize his policy goals, while receiving benefits like access to financial resources, protection from competitors and coordination of research and technology as their reward. Reforms were usually carried out top-down:

One feature of colonialism in Korea was the meticulous process of pursuing state-mandated change through legal reforms announced and implemented with the full authority of the government-general.

(McNamara 1990: 37)

US–American ideas and concepts: Since 1945, the United States replaced Japan as the role model for South Korea. Concepts like rule of law, market economy, free trade and the far–reaching separation of government and business became increasingly important. They doubtlessly inspired, influenced and shaped the bureaucracy and the administrative leaders of South Korea. But we should also keep in mind that the United States were the largest donor of economic aid and the most important export market, they provided military security, and they were the political mentor of South Korea on the international scene. That did not leave too much space for an independent and free choice. Instead, visibly following the American way was imperative for the survival and the well–being of South Korea. Today, what is dubbed Globalization (but quite often is simply Americanization) is well evident in Korea, concerning, among others, most institutional structures and formal rules. Korea is an active member of leading international organizations including the WTO, the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank and the UNO. It has a representative democracy, frequent and relatively clean elections, a free press and civil organizations monitoring the work of the leadership, and a strong and multinationally active business community.



Sources of Korea's Regulatory Tradition: Visibility versus Relevance

It is remarkable that the relevance and the visibility of these three factors stand in an inversely proportional relationship to each other. The less visible factor, the Neo–Confucian tradition, is the most important one, followed by Japan's example. The concepts, structures and terminology of mostly US–American origin are all–present in today's Korea but in fact, their presence stands in no relation to their relevance. Under the globally standardized surface there is not always what can be expected from the mere terminology. The political system is plagued by regionalism, the National Assembly is extremely weak against a strong Executive Branch, collusive ties between private businesses and politicians are not a rare

exception, the press may come under siege if too critical, and even civil organizations and their members find themselves mired in scandals and influence-peddling. In the context of economic nationalism, the citizens show a considerably strong demand for protectionism in favor of the otherwise unpopular conglomerates in order to secure the well-being of the national economy.

Korea...is a country where customs reign over law, personal interests dictate people's behavior and attitudes, the government lacks a sense of responsibility, and ends are valued over the means amid lax social discipline.

(Kim Il-sup, the President of the Korea Accounting Institute, in: The JoongAng Ilbo, January 22, 2002, explaining why Korea received an extremely low ranking in the International Committee for Transparency's 1998, 1999 and 2000 reports.)

It surely is debatable whether this always is a correct description; however, it becomes clear that simply announcing that several standards are established does not automatically mean that this is the case in reality. The regulators face a number of challenges in this environment: They must follow international rules, while simultaneously catering to the demands by the national electorate and to their own interests. This, in fact, often results in a catch-22. The case of telecommunications reforms shows how skillfully the Korean administration was able to manage this complicated situation.

2. Korean Telecommunications Reform 1981–2000

The story of telecommunications reform in South Korea reflects the complicated situation in which the country finds itself since the 1980s: Massive and hardly ignorable external demands for liberalization and market opening opposed to a strong internal demand for protection (industry) and social safety (citizens). During the nearly 20 years of telecommunications reform, the South Korean state developed one possible solution for balancing those multiple interests, which can also be applied on other sectors: External pressure like the one exerted through trade negotiations is used to pacify internal forces and to break their resistance by referring to international obligations and norms, while adopting unpopular measures without risking too much on the inner political scene. The latter becomes an increasingly important policy tool especially since the introduction and development of democracy since the

late 1980s, reflecting the search of the political leadership in Korea for new methods of ruling the country.

The regulatory reform in South Korea's telecommunications started in the early 1980s as a typical example of economic policy. After the heavy and chemical industries had been built up in the 1970s, the administration identified an increasing need for an improvement of the nation's communications infrastructure. The bureaucrats sided with private business to resolve the issue and to push for development. That, very typically, included a structural reform of the relevant institutions. The monopolist was outsourced from the Ministry and turned into the Korea Telecommunications Authority in 1981; other specialized companies (all state-owned) followed suit like DACOM in 1982 and Korea Mobile Telecom in 1984. The strategy of the state was to separate regulation and management and to diversify the sector, while not giving up control. In December 1983, the legal framework was overhauled by creating two new laws: the Framework Act on Telecommunications and the Public Telecommunications Business Act. The heavily subsidized rates for local calls were raised by more than 100% between 1980 and 1986 to reflect real costs. Research and Development was organized and funded by the state under participation by the private sector. Major institutions like the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI) were founded for that purpose. The 1980s witness the emergence of such large companies like Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, Daewoo Telecom and LG Electronics which – quite reluctantly at the beginning – became the agents of the state. Visible efforts have been made concerning telecommunications hardware, namely electronic switches and terminal equipment. That resembles a policy known as import-substitution supplemented by export-promotion. In fact, South Korea was among the first countries in the world to open the market for terminal equipment and thereby created a huge internal demand. When the private companies became dissatisfied with the rewards for their fulfillment of the state's economic policy goals in telecommunications, they were given a chance to participate in the services market. That started with Value-added Services in the early 1980s, catalyzed by the bilateral trade pressure by the USA in early 1989, when Korea was designated as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) under Section 1374 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.

In the early 1990s, after a complete liberalization of the value-added market, the strict separation of business activities between the telecommunications companies was lifted. Notably, DACOM entered the

market for International Long Distance in late 1991. According to the new policy, the regulatory framework was overhauled again, allowing for companies to act as providers of general, specific or value-added services. Concerning ownership in these companies, we see a strong determination by the government to prevent a too strong influence by both foreign investors and Chaebol. A duopoly strategy was introduced in mobile communications and paging, the former leading to the first major corruption scandal in Korean telecommunications in connection with the licensing process in 1992. This case is interesting: The Sunkyong Group had to give back its mobile telecommunications license, and the Shinsegi consortium emerged as the lucky winner. But only a few months later and under a new president of the ROK, Sunkyong nevertheless managed to acquire a presence in the mobile market – the company was allowed to buy a majority of shares (23%) in the formerly state-owned Korea Mobile Telecom, today's SK Telecom.

New impulses for reform came from the Uruguay-Round and renewed American trade pressure. The regulators realized that they had no choice but to open up the market sooner or later. The strategy was to concede to the foreign demands, but as slowly as possible, while trying to make the own industry strong and competitive, in order to be ready to compete at home with international companies. This strategy has proved to be very successful until present time, and it is one reason for the explosive growth of the domestic telecommunications market. The Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) was reorganized, competition was introduced into all sectors of the telecommunications market including local, long distance and international long distance connections as well as mobile communications. Restrictions on foreign ownership have been lifted gradually, catalyzed by the crisis in 1997/1998. The separation of an independent regulatory authority (Korea Communications Commission) from the Ministry is planned – but not realized yet –, and the privatization of Korea Telecom is finally reaching its end.

The motivation of the state for these many far-reaching reforms was manifold: Providing a crucial infrastructure for the further development of the domestic industry, to nurture a new high-growth sector, and to protect the domestic market. All this led to deregulation and liberalization which could easily be misinterpreted as a strong dedication to free market principles. But in fact, it reflects long-standing goals of public administration in Korea: Protecting the domestic industry, securing a stable growth of the National Income, and, as a means to these ends, keeping control of the market. The privatization of KT may serve as a short example.

Quite surprisingly, in May 2002 SK Telecom was allowed to buy an 11.34 percent stake in KT. This move by the MIC was brilliant: It had to privatize KT, but did not want to lose control over the leading telecommunications company in Korea. Since SK Telecom is the dominant company in the mobile communications market, it is already subject to a strict regulation by the MIC and the Fair Trade Commission. In the name of protecting fair competition and free market principles, the government can dictate the direction of SK Telecom's business activities and thereby continue to influence the telecommunications market, while avoiding the criticism it faced before for steering the sector directly via the MIC.

3. A Case in Point: The IMT-2000 issue

The licensing procedure for 3rd Generation Mobile Communications (IMT-2000) has many advantages from an academic point of view. It is a very recent case, but nevertheless, all major decisions are already made. The interaction of three important interest groups – the state, private business and international forces – is clearly visible. In the course of the policy process, most dilemmas of the current regulatory system in South Korea are exemplified. It becomes clear that the licensing procedure presents a model case of regulation in Korea, including the management of many contradicting interests of various groups by the regulators, namely the Ministry of Information and Communication.

After the exceptionally dynamic development of 2nd Generation (digital) mobile communications from the mid-1990s and amidst a tech stock hype in 1999 and early 2000, the mobile communications system of the next generation was perceived to be a bonanza to make everybody rich overnight who was able to secure a claim. Further, it was widely held that without being part of the 3G mobile communications business, the very survival on the market was at stake. It was therefore no surprise that all major and many smaller telecommunications companies of Korea rushed for one of the licenses.

The regulators faced a number of important issues to decide:

- ◆ time schedule for the licensing
- ◆ technical standard for the licenses

- ◆ number of licenses
- ◆ licensing method

All this had to be done as transparent and collusion-free as possible. The regulators were well aware of the negative experiences with licensing procedures for other services in the past and accordingly of the keen attention of domestic and international watchers. The licensing procedure for the second mobile carrier in 1992 ended in an eclat when Sunkyong (Daehan Telecom Consortium) had to return its license to pacify the protesting public. The licensing for 2G mobile communications in 1996 found itself at the center of a controversial debate in the National Assembly in 1998, and a number of high-ranking officials ended in jail. Korea, as an OECD and WTO member and just about to recover from the crisis of 1997/1998, could not afford another scandal in 2000.

Time Schedule: The time schedule for the licensing procedure was decided upon in July 1999 by the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC). According to this time table, in March 2000 the technical standard and in June the number of licenses and the licensing method had to be announced. The applications had to be submitted in September, and the final decision was to be made in December 2000.

Technical Standard: This was one of the most problematic decisions. Korea had gone its own way since 1996 in 2G mobile communications with the minority CDMA-standard, based on technology by US-based Qualcomm, while 80% of the world market used the European GSM. The effects of this situation were manifold: (1) Roaming, i.e. switching between the networks of different carriers, was nearly impossible due to the differing technologies; (2) Korean hardware could not be exported to other markets without extra investment in the other technology, and (3) Korean service providers were in a disadvantageous position for the entry into foreign telecommunications markets. These negative effects were sided by more positive ones: (1) Foreigners who could not use their own mobile phones in Korea had to buy or rent new ones, thereby fostering the domestic demand; (2) Korean hardware producers faced very little competition from foreign companies, since the relatively small market did not justify massive investments in an alien standard, and (3) the same was true for foreign service providers. To sum it up, the decision in favor of the minority CDMA standard had effectively protected the domestic market from foreign competition and allowed the domestic companies to grow very safely and to acquire necessary technical and managerial skills.

But in 2000, the situation had changed significantly if compared to the mid-1990s. The domestic market was saturated; from June to August, the number of mobile phone customers decreased after a steady growth in the years before.

	June 2000	share	August 2000	share	
<i>SK Telecom</i>	11.552.105	43,47	11.165.147	43,24	57,32
<i>Shinsegi Telecom</i>	3.752.285	14,12	3.636.228	14,08	
<i>KT Freetel</i>	4.968.939	18,70	4.881.524	18,88	29,02
<i>Hansol M.com</i>	2.691.397	10,13	2.619.418	10,14	
<i>LG Telecom</i>	3.605.486	13,57	3.529.806	13,66	13,66
Total					

Market for Mobile Communications in South Korea

(source: MIC)

The Korean telecommunications operators had matured and were undertaking mergers, and the hardware producers like Samsung Electronics (SEC) and LG Information and Communications (LGIC) increasingly eyed for global markets. The Korean market was now large enough to justify extra R&D expenses by international hardware producers. In addition, the payment of royalties to Qualcomm became a target of nationalist debate and was extensively discussed in the Korean media. Again, a decision had to be made between two rivaling standards: The asynchronous W-CDMA mode, bound to be the next majority standard, and the synchronous CDMA-2000 mode, a follow-up technology of Korea's CDMA. A large number of powerful interest groups was affected by the outcome of the decision, and they all tried to influence the decision-makers in their favor.

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Korean government ◆ bureaucrats of the MIC ◆ domestic service providers ◆ domestic hardware producers ◆ foreign companies |
|---|

The government in Korea is traditionally regarded by the electorate as being responsible for steady economic growth and the protection of the domestic market while simultaneously barring the Chaebol from expanding their dominance. KISDI and ETRI offered different estimates on the economic effects of 3G mobile communications, but they agreed that they would be positive.

	estimate by KISDI	estimate by ETRI
<i>Production generating effect</i>	28 Trillion Won	49 Trillion Won
<i>Value added generating effect</i>	2.1 Billion Won	3.1 Billion Won
<i>Employment generating effect</i>	420,000 jobs	550,000 jobs

Forecasted Economic Effects of the IMT-2000 Project

(source: KT&I 5/2000: 23)

The objectives of the governmental side were to (1) ensure that Korea did not miss an important technology, (2) foster a prospective growth industry and (3) prevent a domination of the telecommunications sector by the Chaebol.

The bureaucrats of the MIC naturally wanted to remain in control of the sector to justify their very existence and to keep their powerful position within the administration, among others against powerful competitors like the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE). The times when the Ministry of Post and Communications was considered to be the less attractive workplace in the administration were not over for too long. On the other hand, the whole administration faced a strong domestic and international demand for transparency, deregulation and a hands-off policy. The objectives of the bureaucracy were (1) to secure a stable future of their Ministry and (2) to comply with the demands for good government.

The domestic service providers wanted a quick introduction of the new service. They also wanted to get rid of the dependency on the domestic hardware providers and increasingly targeted international markets for their products. Due to a de facto existing cartel of domestic hardware producers on one side and harsh competition among service providers on the other, the high costs for terminal equipment could not be passed on to the consumers and thereby reduced the profits of the service providers. Most service providers supported the W-CDMA standard.

Domestic hardware producers were also interested in expanding to international markets, but wanted to keep the domestic market as closed as possible to foreign competition in order to possess a secure source of income. Most hardware producers (with the exception of LGIC) supported the CDMA-2000 standard.

Foreign companies had differing interests depending on their place of origin and applied technology. Qualcomm wanted to keep Korea as one of its major customers and lobbied for CDMA-2000. Others like Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia wanted the market to become more easily accessible and – at least partially – supported the W-CDMA standard.

This brief and superficial analysis of motivations and objectives of the involved interest groups shows that the regulators in Korea faced a "mission: impossible" if they wanted to satisfy all demands.

Number of licenses: The available bandwidth for IMT-2000 was 60 MHz. The MIC estimated a minimum bandwidth of 5 MHz for 1 Million customers and regarded 3 to 5 licenses as desirable. In June 2000 the MIC announced its decision to offer 3 licenses. This would foster the profitability of the selected operators; it also was in line with a policy to support concentration in the Korean telecommunications market, which was explicitly announced in early 2001.

Licensing method: For market watchers, it was relatively clear from the outset that an auction would not be chosen. It maximizes fiscal benefits for the state, but public debt was not a major concern for Korea. With the exception of the post-crisis years 1998 and 1999, the borrowing dependency ratio was a single-digit number since 1983 (T'onggyech'ong 2001: 236). An auction weakens the successful bidder financially and thereby reduces his sources for investment into the newly acquired business area – a counterproductive effect if the domestic industry was to be supported strategically. Returning the auction revenues to the successful bidders by way of subsidies was problematic due to Korea's membership in the WTO. Last but not least, an auction diverts influence away from the regulators, since there is only one, very transparent criterion: the paid amount. That would have left the MIC no chance to regulate the result of the licensing procedure. If contrasted to the many interests as described above, it was no surprise that the MIC opted for the so-called "beauty-contest" method. Here, a catalogue of weighted criteria was applied to select the successful bidders. Even though this process

was watched by the public and was relatively transparent, the selection of the criteria alone left many options for the MIC to steer the outcome.

The MIC soon realized that there was no single solution for the large number of problems it faced. After a lot of maneuvering back and forth and frequently changing its own announcements, on October 10, 2000, the Ministry therefore finally opted for a compromise: Two of the licenses had to be given for W-CDMA, and one of CDMA-2000, each with a bandwidth of 20 MHz. All three contenders – Korea Telecom, SK Telecom and LG Telecom – applied for an asynchronous W-CDMA license. That made sense, since the MIC had announced that the loser would get the chance to apply for the remaining CDMA-2000 license in May 2001. Surprisingly, nearly in the last moment, the consortium around Hanaro reemerged after its official dissolution and solely applied for the CDMA-2000 license on October 31, 2000. What appeared to be a brilliant move was quickly overturned by the MIC: Hanaro did not reach a minimum of credits in the evaluation process of its application in December and was not granted a license. KT (84 credits) and SKT (82 credits) received the two W-CDMA licenses, LG Telecom lost by one credit but was offered to file an application again in May for the remaining CDMA-2000 license. The loser was in fact in a strong position: In order for the MIC's compromise to work, the synchronous CDMA-2000 license had to find an owner. Accordingly, LG Telecom demanded and received a number of favors. Among them was an increase of LG Telecom's market share to 20%, which had to be secured by "asynchronous regulation". In a paradox move, SK Telecom started to sell products of its competitors in its sales outlets to reduce the own market share under the 50% demanded by the Fair Trade Commission. With the support of the MIC, LG Telecom was able to create a consortium with Hanaro and Powercomm as minority members and was granted the remaining CDMA-2000 license on August 25, 2001.

The Korean government had done the impossible: All involved players could regard themselves as winners. Due to the demand for asymmetric regulation, the MIC retained its influence. Korea introduces the majority standard but does not completely lose the investments into the other one made in the last years. A trade conflict with the USA was prevented since Qualcomm will continue to receive its royalties. Two major service providers will be able to participate in international competition. The domestic hardware producers have at least one domestic customer for their synchronous equipment. LG Telecom survived on the market and acquired a secure place in the planned structure of the sector. Hanaro

even though only as a junior partner of LG Telecom, is inside of the boat. The customers in Korea will have the choice between the two standards.

4. Conclusion: Unexpected Harmony

To conclude: Korea already for a long time, but increasingly in the last two decades, faces a complicated situation. It finds itself in a dilemma: On one hand, there are the demands of a globalized economy in general and Korea's major trading partners in particular, plus a substantial interdependence in questions of security and external politics. These pledges cannot be ignored. The formal and informal rules have to be followed, the institutions in Korea have to be rearranged to fit into this system. But on the other hand, there are national characteristics based on a long historical tradition and shaping the whole society on all levels from interpersonal social relationships up to regulation and government. These characteristics belong to the society, they shape it, and they make it unique and special. They actually make Korea being Korea, and therefore are most valuable and must be respected. This does not mean that these patterns are not subject to change – but hopefully and for sure, they will not just disappear within a second.

The only solution to this dilemma is simple and complicated at one time: Not to regard it as a dilemma. It is an opportunity. According to the results of my work, Koreans have been quite successful in interpreting Western concepts like rule of law, democracy, liberalism, and transparency in a way that corresponds with, and not contradicts, the Korean way of life. The telecommunications reform has shown a remarkably pragmatic ability to avoid or quickly end open conflicts that cannot be won anyway. The basic strategy appears to be "giving in when there is no other option, but only as much as is really needed". In the mid-1990s, Korea skillfully used multilateral agreements and organizations, namely the WTO, to protect itself from too strong bilateral pressure. This is like transferring a fist-fight from a dark and empty street to a crowded schoolyard: The other guy has no choice but to play fair, then. Unfortunately, oneself has to play to the rules, too. Here, the IMT-2000 case shows how against all odds, the Korean government was able to put through all of its major goals. It did never lose control, it managed to find solutions to difficult problems and to convince the other players to employ these ways. Finally and impressively, all involved parties end up as winners: The foreign partners, the native private companies, the bureaucracy, and most likely even the consumers.

"Korea Inc." has become a multinational company. The author suggests that IMT-2000 licensing is not a single issue, and that it did not accidentally take place the way it did. It rather shows us the successful way South Korea integrates itself in the global community without losing its identity, and how the country's leadership is able to harmoniously balance contrasting interests. This model with all its details is most probably not suited for a direct export to other nations, but in principle, we learn that there is a viable, peaceful and mutually satisfactory way out of a dilemma most countries in this world are facing more or less.

References:

Chang, Chan Sup and Chang Nahn Joo (1994): *The Korean Management System: Cultural, Political and Economic Foundations*, Westport and London: Quorum Books

Cho Shin, Byung-il Choi and Seon-Kyou Choi (1996): *Restructuring the Korean Telecommunications Market: Evolution and Challenges Ahead*, in: *Telecommunications Policy* 20/5 (1996), pp. 357-373

Choi, Byung-il (1997): *Political Economy of Telecommunications Market Opening in Korea: Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Interests*, in: *Global Economic Review*, 26/2, Summer 1997, pp. 75-91

Choi, Byung-il (1998): *Telecommunications Regulation in Korea: Evolution and Current Status*, in: *Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 26, December 1998, pp. 243-276

Choi, Byung-sun (1991): *Economic Policymaking in Korea*, Seoul: Chomyung Press

Chung, Kae H., Lee Hak Chong und Jung Ku Hyun (1997): *Korean Management: Global Strategy and Cultural Transformation*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter

Deuchler, Martina (1992): *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press

Frank, Rudiger (2002): Regulierung in der Republik Korea: Kennzeichen und Reformen am Beispiel des Telekommunikationssektors, Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming

Hahm, Sung Deuk (1999): Structural and Rational Foundations for Executive-Bureaucratic Politics in Korea, in: *Korea Journal* 39/2 Summer 1999, pp. 99-132

Hahm, Sung Deuk and L. Christopher Plein (1997): After Development: The Transformation of Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press

Henderson, Gregory (1978): *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press

Hwang, Chul-Jeung (1999): An Overview of the Telecommunications Regulatory System in Korea: The Past, Present and the Future, Seoul: Korea Association of Information and Telecommunication

Jung, Yong-Duck (1999): Administrative Reform in Korea: A Historical-Institutionalist Perspective, in: *Korea Journal* 39/2, Summer 1999, pp. 5-22

Kim, Bun Woong und Pan Suk Kim (1997): *Korean Public Administration*, Seoul: Hollym

Kim, Byung-kook und Suh Jin-young (1997): Politics of Reform in Confucian Korea, in: *Korea Focus* 5/6 1997, pp. 8-32

KT&I (Korea Trade and Investment), Seoul: Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency

Larson, James F. (1995): *The Telecommunications Revolution in Korea*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press

Lee, Nae-Chan und Han-Young Lie (2000): *Korea's Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations*, Seoul: KISDI 2000

McNamara, Dennis (1990): *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise. 1910-1945*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press

T'onggyech'ong (2001): *Hanguk Chuyo Kyongje Chip'yo* 2001.3, Seoul

Woo, Jung-en (1991): *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization*, New York: Columbia University Press