

Late Choson–era Korean Interaction with Japanese in Pusan: Defining Boundaries

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Only by moving grandly on the macroscopic level can we satisfy our intellectual and human curiosities. But only by moving minutely on the molecular level can our observations and explanations be adequately connected. So, if we would have our cake and eat it too, we must shuttle between the macroscopic and the molecular levels in instituting the problem *and* in explaining it ? developing the molecular index structure of general concepts and the general conceptual implications of molecular variables....We must build up molecular terms; we must break down macroscopic conceptions. For, as matters now stand, the propositional meaning of many macroscopic statements is ambiguous and unclear; the conceptual meaning of many molecular statements is often barren. (C. Wright Mills)

Theoretical Introduction

The power of ideas seems undeniable. The hot and cold industrial wars of the twentieth century were, in many ways, confrontations of abstract ideas, and these industrial wars depended on the mass mobilisation of troops and industrial labourers. Mobilisation was made easier by ideas that constructed national identities. Of course, nation building in Europe relied on identity construction from before the twentieth century, but large-scale industrial war proved its virulence. We have conventionally referred to identity construction as the central project of nationalism, and lately, debate has raged over whether identities are ancient (primordialists) or recently constructed (modernists).

Anthony Smith, representative of the primordialist school, seeks the roots of national identity in a plethora of continuous identities that link premodern agricultural societies, even ancient societies, to modern industrial societies. Smith argues that almost all successful nations have clear ethnic identities that have allowed them to mobilize vast numbers of people in the industrial age and form nation-states. The nation-state is a recent phenomenon, Smith concedes, but the pre-existence of ethnic identity allowed it to emerge and that pre-existing or latent ethnic identity was often the necessary condition for the success or failure of the nation-state.

Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson represent approaches from modernist and materialist perspectives, and they emphasise the development of new technologies and colonial expansion as creators of new social arrangements and world-views. The shift of industrial production towards “semantic” or literate labour and print capitalism threw up discontinuities between the agricultural and industrial worlds. Industry needed literate labour. Mass education and the creation of a market for the mass circulation of newspapers, magazines, and books enabled an elite culture ? a cult of particularity ? to be established as the measure of identity. The rising use of vernaculars in combination with print capitalism allowed the creation of common time and a sense of common destiny. In short, industrial production created both the need and the means for the mass production and consumption of intellectual conformity, something that had been the monopoly of a narrow elite. Gellner concedes that some nations have ancient ethnic identities while others have none, but he strenuously argues against Smith and asserts that the vast majority of nation-states have invented identities because the conditions of modernity require this. For Gellner and Anderson, mentalities arise from the material conditions of the modern world: industrial production, mass literacy, mass markets, and colonial models that affect the metropole society.

Thongchai Winichakul offers a similar approach that focuses on the conceptual moment and the technological means of national construction. Like much of Southeast Asia, pre-modern Siam had frontiers but lacked boundaries. To preserve its integrity from the predations of European imperialism, the Siamese court was forced to adopt a geographical or topographical world-view that constructed space using a European cosmology based on mathematics. The technology was cartography and the result was the map with meridian lines. Such a map matched European constructions and implied a full and even exercise of sovereignty over the

land between specified boundaries, a view that nineteenth-century Europe was also developing. With this, the “nation” as territory could be visually presented, thereby legitimating all the necessities of a “modern” defence of those borders.

Liah Greenfeld separates national identity from any system of production or technology and focuses on political history and the literary production of capital elites caught in various crises of identity. Individual states of mind ? dissatisfied states of mind ? led to action that created social structures and ideas, which produced further states of mind, which produced new social structures, and so on. For example, in the English case, the original dissatisfied state of mind was the desire by English elites to separate England from Catholic Christendom, the identification of Protestantism with nation, and the loyalty of newly created social groups to the opportunities for social mobility opened by the Tudor seizure of Church estates. Dissatisfied and newly emergent literate elites were the creators of mentalities. Nationalism appeared first in the English form as ‘individualistic-libertarian’ and then later in the French, Russian, and German forms as ‘collectivistic-authoritarian’ . In all situations, the appearance of a national consciousness elevated the entire (literate) populace to become the possessors of legitimate sovereignty and that created the basis of modern democratic governance. This is modernity, and it was created by literate urban elites.

These few paragraphs are nothing more than brief notes on a few recent approaches to the question of nationalism, but they serve to illustrate a problem common to such discussions: they discuss the development of political, economic, and cultural cores by assuming that the boundaries and frontiers of countries were passive and receptive vessels. Cores do mobilize wealth and power and seek self-definition, but cores inevitably have peripheries and frontiers: some of them are interior and some of them abut other countries. In addition to focusing on developments at the cores, be they cartographical (Thongchai), technological (Anderson), social (Gellner), or intellectual (Greenfeld and Smith), we might also consider the boundaries and frontiers for expressions of identity. Here, the core’s “mode of production” or the “orthodox discourse” takes second place to the day-to-day interactions of one people with another. Fredrik Barth’s paradigmatic essay on ethnic groups and boundaries focuses squarely on engagement at the boundary in contrast to abstracted thinking from the remove of the centre. Barth writes, “I would argue that people’s categories are for acting, and are significantly affected by interaction rather than contemplation.”

Barth is concerned with ethnicity. He separates ethnicity from culture and concentrates on ascription to an ethnic category. He argues that what usually passes for a discussion of culture is really no more than a catalogue of traits. These traits or institutional forms change over time and they change with ecological niche. Therefore, ethnic groups are best thought of as groups that *identify* themselves to be different and groups that *are identified* by other groups as different. In both cases, the purpose of identification is to engage in interaction with other groups. The cultural content that identifies ethnic groups is composed of “overt signals” (dress, language, food, life–style) and “basic value orientations: the standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged.” The main activity that ensures continuity of the ethnic group, the activity that gives it its existence, is the maintenance of the boundary or the structured and rigid practice of overt signals and the application of standards to judge the performance of its constituency. The boundary defines the group, “not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” Finally, boundaries are maintained between groups by interaction that is structured to allow the persistence of difference. This implies rigidity of interaction, but it also allows for the permeability of ascription. If one acts in accordance with the group’s value orientations and adopts the group’s institutional forms, then one can claim membership. Of course, this also implies that two groups will accent their differences for easy mutual recognition. In short, at the boundaries we can expect to find the clearest definition of group membership, since there differences matter the most.

Barth was unconcerned with the state, and his theoretical template has been employed most often to examine the metaphorical borders of deterritorialised postmodern identities. By contrast, Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan are unconcerned with metaphorical borders and focus on the dialectic between states and their borders: “The anthropological study of the everyday lives of border communities is simultaneously the study of the daily life of the state....” Because the border and the center are in a dialectic, the border is valuable for what it can tell us about the “interplay between nation and state...an anthropology of borders sits squarely within the wider anthropology of nationalism.”

The seminal work in this regard is Peter Sahlins’ study of the boundary between France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Sahlins takes the usual assertion that modern nations were built from the center outwards and then reverses it: “The Cerdanya is a case where the nation appeared on the periphery before it was built by the centre....” Between 1659 (France and Spain divided the valley by the Peace of the Pyrenees) and 1868 (the

Treaty of Bayonne stipulated the laying of stones to mark the boundary), the frontier between France and Spain collapsed from a jurisdictional patchwork into a territorialised border. Over these two centuries, the people in this Catalan valley developed national identities and a national boundary ? a line. Identities and a boundary were not imposed from the outside. “Foreigner” originally referred to a landowner who lived elsewhere or the inhabitant of another village. Local residents maintained a variety of boundaries and usufruct rights and paid rents and taxes according to the identity of the official, not his spatial location:

“Jurisdictional sovereignty was above all a relation between king and subject, not between king and territory.” The territorialisation of the Cerdanya came with the imposition from Spain of a territorial property tax on the villages in 1717 and a cadastral survey in 1732. The new revolutionary government in France took a similar step in 1791 followed by a cadastral survey in the 1820s. From the late eighteenth century, the villagers began to look to the national centers for patrons to be enlisted in local claims over land and water use. For example, in 1777, the French King found himself in receipt of a petition from the French Cerdanya requesting aid to limit “Spainards” in their use of pastures. By 1825, local disputes over pastureland and water rights turned violent and involved clear assertions of “French” and “Spanish” nationality. Without giving up their Catalan and Cerdanya identities, the local villagers acquired Spanish and French identities as a way to appeal to the centers. Part of their appeal was pleas to define the boundary.

Among Sahlins’ many contributions to this problem of boundaries is his clarification of concepts. The word “frontier” carries a zonal connotation and “boundary” and “border” carry a linear connotation. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel offer different definitions of the terms frontier, boundary, and border. They argue that “boundary” has a diplomatic usage and is used to indicate the division between cultures or peoples.

“Border” has been used to refer to psychological differences and regions. “Frontier” implies territorial expansion of nations or civilisations. Rather than these terms, Baud and van Schendel prefer the term “borderlands” to indicate,

...broad scenes of intense interactions in which people from both sides work out everyday accommodations based on face-to-face relationships. In this way, the study of border regions implies a critique of state-centered

approaches that picture borders as unchanging, uncontested, and unproblematic.

For our purposes, we will use “frontier” or “borderlands” to refer to a zone or region bisected by a legal “boundary” where the peoples on either side of the boundary interact with each other. The Japanese in Pusan were, from 1512, clearly limited to their compound ? the walls were the boundary. This paper examines an aspect of the interaction of people inside and outside of these walls, and our chief concern is with the control of people’ s movements or the exercise of sovereignty.

Sahlins also helps to clarify the concepts of sovereignty and territory. Sovereignty was jurisdictional, and in the Cerdanya valley, the patchwork of sovereignties slowly collapsed into a territorial definition of the national boundary. In Korea, the land itself was territorialised vis-a-vis the Japanese, because of the sea and the compound walls. Korean concerns with sovereignty were directed at the control of people, not of land. From the sixteenth century, land use was not at issue; people and their movements were.

Changing perceptions

In the winter of 1728–1729, a Confucian advisor to the Tsushima *daimyō*, Amenomori Hōshō, wrote an extended series of memos to his lord entitled *Kōrin teisei* (‘Sober Advice on Relations with Korea’). In these memoranda Hōshō poses the thesis that Korean attitudes towards Japanese underwent change over the century and a quarter from the end of Hideyoshi’s invasion to the early eighteenth century. Hōshō argues that from the end of Hideyoshi's campaigns in 1598 to about 1615, “fear” dominated Korean attitudes towards Japan. From 1615 to 1657, fear changed to “avoidance,” and from 1657 to the time of writing (ca. 1728), Koreans became “inured” to Japanese bluster. His dates derive from the reign dates of the successive Tsushima lords in the seventeenth century.

Hōshō warned that while Korean attitudes were changing, Japanese attitudes remained fixed. The Japanese, believed their “prowess,” their “authority,” proven during the Hideyoshi invasions, yet reverberated in the Korean consciousness. They entertained the notion that threats and blustering in negotiation with Koreans always resulted in success. In fact, argued Hōshō, from the time of the move to the new Waegwan at Ch'oryang in 1678, Japanese “authority” had begun to evaporate before the eyes of the Koreans, although Japanese were not conscious of such.

H?sh?'s point was to impress upon his lord a sense of the changed circumstances, which now required knowledge of Korean affairs where there had been ignorance, sensitivity to Korean customs and sensibilities where there had been bluster, and simple tact where there had been threats.

This paper offers a case study that examines H?sh?'s thesis of changing circumstances from the late seventeenth century into the early eighteenth century. The Waegwan was more than the site of trade and diplomacy. It was also the site of contests over authority and power. By examining these contests, we will begin to grasp the boundaries of what constituted so-called “good relations” at the practical, working level of international relations, and we will glimpse the Korean normative standard of behaviour expected of the Japanese. Without this knowledge, we are left with nothing more than the platitudes, hopes, and personal preferences of metropolitan political and intellectual figures at far remove from the working end of contact with another people.

The *Py?Ilye chibyō* (Collection of Border Precedents) devotes an entire chapter to the problem of Japanese leaving the Waegwan compound to wander about the Korean countryside without authorization. The Korean term for this was *nanch'ul*, which literally meant “disorderly exiting” or “rioting and storming out.” Direct penetration of Korea by Japanese came as defiance of Korean authority and unauthorised departures from the Waegwan to move around the countryside. It also came as impregnating Korean women, but that is another story. Indirect penetration came as smuggling that corrupted both society and economy.

Limitations on Movement

Before examining the cases recorded in the *Py?Ilye chibyō*, we should clarify what regulations governed the movement of the Japanese and the Koreans at the Waegwan. First, let us consider the restrictions in force during the Tumo Waegwan period (1607–1678). A 1646 Agreement in the *Pongnae kosa* is the first indication in the post-Hideyoshi period of passes being used for entry and exit to the Waegwan. We find the same Agreement in the *Ch?ngj?ng kyorinji*, but there it is dated 1653. Both note that without “passes” Japanese were forbidden to come and go. All comings and goings were to be reported to the Japan House Master. Japanese without passes were considered “disorderly.” The 1653 entry in the *Ch?ngj?ng kyorinji* also stipulates that any Korean other than a Tongnae official or a Tongnae-issued pass-holder who entered the

Waegwan was to be charged with criminal activities. Japanese leaving the compound did not have authorization to cross the river in front of the old Waegwan in Tumo, near the Pusan Garrison. Outside the gate Japanese were able to buy daily necessities at a morning market run by Korean fishmongers and green grocers. This Agreement, like many others, possibly followed a particularly disputatious incident directly relevant to our topic of “disorderly exiting.” In the ninth month of 1652, a smuggling ring was uncovered which involved collusion between Korean and Japanese merchants. The Tongnae Magistrate punished the Korean merchants and demanded punishment for the guilty Japanese. The Waegwan's *Taegwan* (J.: *Daikan*, one of the Tsushima lord's trade deputies), arguing that the practices were, in fact, the norm, recruited 93 Japanese in the Waegwan, marched off to Tongnae, and demanded to negotiate directly with the Magistrate. Of course, to defy the chain of command in such an unprecedented and threatening manner was unacceptable to the Koreans. All complaints were to go first through the interpreters, the *Hundo* and *Py?lch'a*. The Tsushima *daimy?* eventually recalled the *Taegwan* and his followers, most likely as a result of Korean complaints, in the twelfth month, and in the following year agreed to the restrictions listed above.

A 1672 entry in the *Ch?pdae Waein saye* (Instances of Receiving Japanese) concerns itself with the prevention of smuggling by Korean locals under the responsibility of the Pusan Garrison Commander's Office. Although their entry and exit to the Waegwan could not be prevented, punishment for their crimes was to be heavily visited on the Garrison Commander. In 1676, restrictions on entry by Koreans were re-stated: only those accompanied by officials or bearing passes were allowed. Women were expressly forbidden. In the previous year, the earthen perimeter wall was re-built in stone.

Turning now to the Ch'oryang Waegwan period (1678–1873), we can see Korean authorities enforcing stricter and stricter controls. The exterior limit at the old Tumo Waegwan was the river. Since the new Ch'oryang Waegwan completed in 1678 was larger, less geographically defined, and farther from the Pusan Garrison, definite boundaries were necessary. From the Korean perspective, the construction of a new Waegwan in a new location offered the government an excellent opportunity to put more legal definition to the scope of Japanese movement.

A 1678 Agreement on the morning market includes limitations on the geographic extent of Japanese movement outside the walls of the new Waegwan. The details of that Agreement are as follows: to the seaside, Japanese could not cross the harbour and go and come to Ch'ly'ng Island; to the west, Japanese could not go farther than the banquet hall (outside the northern wall); to the east, Japanese could not go farther than the guest house (towards the Pusan Garrison). For daily necessities, Japanese could buy fish and vegetables from villagers in front of the main gate, but could not go to the villagers' hamlet. Moreover, followers and attendants accompanying Japanese envoys to the Tongnae Magistrate's office could not fall behind the party or dally in the Korean hamlets and create mischief.

A 1679 entry in the *Ch'ngj'ng kyorinji* expands the geographic limits while at the same time more clearly defines them: to the east, Japanese could go some 300 paces to “Pine Hill;” to the west, Japanese could go about 80 paces to “West Hill;” to the southwest, Japanese could go about 100 paces towards Ch'oryang hamlet; to the south, Japanese could go 100 paces to the shore. In 1683, the returning Korean Embassy to Edo struck an agreement while on Tsushima granting Japanese in the Ch'oryang Waegwan permission to visit ancestral graves near the old Waegwan at Tumo in the spring and fall and a few other days in the year, but the same Agreement forbade Japanese to enter Korean houses along the way. In 1709, presumably because of a smuggling case, the court decreed that all Korean Interpreters going into the Waegwan and all Japanese from the Waegwan going to the residences for the *Hundo* and *Py'Ich' a* had to be accompanied by two Korean officials. Kim Yong-uk points out that mention of wall-jumping and Japanese going into local households in the second article of the new regulations indicates that the problem of illegal sexual liaison had superseded smuggling, an intriguing argument, but given the large number of incidents of small-scale smuggling reported in the *Pyollye Chibyo*, it is difficult to state such conclusively. The 1709 decree implied that the *Hundo* and *P' y'Ich' a* were to be searched, but in 1736, this was suspended as being too humiliating to Korean officials in front of the Japanese. Most smuggling cases involved Korean ginseng for Japanese silver. In a 1738 report from the Tongnae Magistrate that appears in the *Ch'ngj'ng kyorinji*, a long list of violations of the above regulations appears, making the point that access to the Waegwan was, despite controls to the contrary, virtually open. All of these regulations were primarily designed to thwart the free intermingling of Japanese and Koreans and were ostensibly designed to stop smuggling and sexual liaison. Violation of entry restrictions by

Koreans constituted smuggling. Violation of exiting restrictions by Japanese constituted “disorderly exiting.” Below we will examine Japanese violations, or “disorderly exiting,” in detail.

Why Japanese Rioted:

Exploding Frustration or Negotiating Tactic?

The nineteen or so cases listed in the *Py?llye chibyo* under “disorderly exiting” begin with a 1626 entry and end with an entry dated 1824, covering nearly two centuries. Fourteen cases occurred in the seventeenth century, three cases in the eighteenth century, and two cases in the nineteenth century. In general, a change in the seriousness with which these incidents were treated in the Magistrate's reports appears in the 1690s. With the establishment of the new Waegwan at Ch'oryang in 1678, specific agreements defined the distances from the compound Japanese were allowed to roam. With these Agreements, the Magistrate finally had a legal definition for infringements, which he could invoke to demand punishment for violators. Infringements after the 1678 Agreement could not be treated lightly, since the authority of the Tongnae Magistrate and behind him that of the Korean state were at stake.

Incidents prior to and after 1678 were of two general types. Either they were the activities of ordinary Japanese at the Waegwan or they were orchestrated and sometimes led by Waegwan officials. If ordinary traders and sailors ran out of the compound to visit relatives' graves (1665.5, 1695.1), to watch ships (1665.6), to buy fish and vegetables (1708.2, 1710.3), or to demand the delivery of charcoal and firewood (1736.7), that was one thing. But when Waegwan officials, the very people who had enjoined themselves to enforce the regulations, became violators or even leaders, Korean authorities had “no-one to whom [they could] argue criminality,” as Magistrate Yi Se-jae stated the problem in a report dated 1697.8. Prior to the Agreement of 1678, we commonly see officials, notably the *Chaep'an* (J.: *Saihan*), the *Taegwan* (J.: *Daikan*), and the House Master leading upwards of 100 men from the compound. After the 1678 Agreement, the reporting Magistrate singled out any officials among the violators for particular censure, and their punishment became a focus of the Magistrate's communications with the Waegwan.

Another difference between the pre-1678 situation and the post-1678 situation was the physical distance the rioters had to go to make their protest. Prior to the Ch'oryang Waegwan, the Tumo Waegwan was just

beyond the gates of the Pusan Garrison. Its proximity to the Pusan Garrison and the Tongnae Magistracy, just a little beyond, made exiting to lodge complaints easy, but the 4.5 kilometre-remove of the Ch'oryang Waegwan meant complainants had to tramp across the Korean countryside before reaching the gates of either the Pusan Garrison or the county seat. Naturally, the embarrassment to the Korean government was magnified accordingly. Thus from 1678, not only did the Tongnae Magistrate have a diplomatic agreement to enforce (which worked to Korean advantage by explicitly forbidding Japanese from leaving the compound without authorization), but also any challenges to that agreement became more serious. After 1678, challengers had to create a larger, more sustained public display; this required more malice aforethought.

The purpose of rioting and marching out of the Waegwan was to address some complaint directly to the Tongnae Magistrate. The procedure for all communication with the Tongnae Magistrate or the Pusan Garrison Commander dictated that Japanese complaints or messages go through the *Hundo* and the *Py?lch'a*. Oftentimes, the Japanese thought these interpreter-liaison officials were not passing on Japanese complaints to the Magistrate or the Garrison Commander and alternatives were necessary. Rioting and storming out of the Waegwan was one such alternative. Amenomori H?sh? suggested another alternative in his *K?rin Teisei*. That was to break protocol at one of the official banquets or tea receptions and confront the Magistrate personally with some complaint. But storming out of the Waegwan carried sufficient drama to catch the Magistrate's undivided attention.

From the Japanese perspective, marshalling a crowd and marching out the gate to the Pusan Garrison or the county seat was designed to get the attention of authorities above the usual liaison officers and interpreters, but such bold action was also used to pressure a Magistrate whose attention one already had in negotiation. Below we will compare a particularly revealing Japanese document on this point, but to illustrate matters here, let us briefly examine a series of incidents in the early 1670s, during the tenure of Magistrate Ch?ng S?k, whose re-appointment we discussed briefly in Chapter Four.

By 1671, the unfavorable anchorage and exposure of the Tumo Waegwan to strong winds made the site unbearable to the Japanese. In reaction to having yet another petition for relocation turned down, a *Ch'awae* (irregular envoy) from Tsushima led 100 men to the county seat in the eighth month and demanded revision of the Korean diplomatic note

that had just been handed him rejecting Tsushima's request for a removal of the Waegwan. In the tenth month, he or another *Ch'awae* led 70 men to the county seat and withdrew after meeting with the Magistrate and the *Ch?bwigwan* (reception official). Within a month, the Waegwan burned down, so temporary housing had to be found in village houses. A drunken House Master led several tens of men to demand that the Pusan Guest House (*Pusan Kaeksa*) be made available. Again in the same month (1671.11), a *Ch'awae* led 30 men to demand that something be done since the facility was gone. The *Ch'awae* committed suicide in the twelfth month as all his efforts had met with failure: his negotiations to move the Waegwan and his threatening march on Tongnae. The *Sillok* refers to his death as being caused by illness. In response, Korea sent Interpreters (*Y?ggwan*) to Tsushima to negotiate directly with the Tsushima *daimy?*. In the spring of 1672 (fourth month), the House Master led men to a Pusan village where they occupied villagers' homes. In the same month and repeatedly in the sixth month, the Japanese, complaining of cramped quarters, and “overcome with churlishness,” wandered everywhere over the county. Magistrates Ch?ng S?k and Yi Ha were greatly perturbed, but negotiations for the new Waegwan at Ch'oryang went ahead, although none too quickly.

Kim Yong-uk tells us that between 1611 and 1675 negotiations to move the Waegwan occurred eight times. During this time, either by circumstance or design, the Tumo Waegwan managed to burn down no less than six times: 1621, 1667, 1671, 1672, 1674, and 1677. Given the unusual frequency of fires in the 1670s, the rampaging about in 1671 and 1672 may have been tied to a convenient arson or two to push negotiations forward. Kim Yong-uk speculates arson was probably the case in the fire of 1671. Doubt is thrown on this hypothesis by the *Sillok* description of the fire that destroyed the entire compound, seven Japanese ships, and forced the Japanese out of the compound with barely the clothes on their backs. If that fire was arson, then the court suspected nothing, since the throne ordered that Tsushima be given 200 *s?k* of rice and 10 *tong* of cotton (500 bolts) as condolence. In 1673, the Ch'oryang site was agreed, so a motive for arson after that date is difficult to imagine. The matter is yet inconclusive.

Japanese success with riots that spilled out of the compound in the early 1670s nearly saw a repeat in the 1690s, but the Agreement of 1678 defining Japanese culpability intervened to Korean advantage. In the first month of 1695, six Japanese leapt a wall and visited S?n' am Temple where they performed a religious ritual. They returned to the Waegwan

without incident, but their crime was known. The House Master explained to the Korean authorities that they had been hawking and the birds got away; after the hawks went his men, unintentionally committing a crime. He reported to the Magistrate that they had been bound over to Tsushima for adjudication. Officials in Hans?ng demanded that their heads be put on pikes to deter others, since to let matters go would have gutted the new agreements. By the second month, it became clear that the House Master had no intention of extraditing his former charges for certain death and stated that they had been banished. Although the court wanted capital punishment, since no Japanese officials had been involved, the Korean position was weak and Korean justice was forced to rely on Japanese prosecution, with unknown results.

In 1697, a wholly different situation developed. If bulk is any indication of the gravity of the 1697 incident, then we might note that nearly 40% of the chapter in the *Py?llye chibyo* on “disorderly exiting” is devoted to the events beginning in the eighth month of 1697. Fortunately, we also have a fairly detailed report from the Master of the Japan House about the same incident, giving us a chance to glimpse matters from the Japanese side.

The brief note in the Tongnae *?pji* about Magistrate Yi Se-jae's tenure is taken up with a “revolt” by the Japanese and their unexcused exit from the Waegwan.

Because the Japanese rioted and went out [of the Waegwan] to S? am [S?n' am Temple], in 1698.1, the Magistrate was arrested. He had a record of good administration and [later] became a Second Minister (Jr.2).

Because of this incident, Yi Se-jae was interrogated, but having a “record of good administration,” he was eventually promoted. Such promotions probably indicate an appreciation in the center for the difficulty of the frontier post.

When we turn to his reports in the *Py?llye chibyo*, we can easily understand the central government's appreciation. Yi Se-jae had a very difficult situation on his hands, but throughout the course of events, he maintained a clear grasp of the key issue: Waegwan officials had personally led their own men out of the Waegwan in complete contempt of the Agreement of 1678.

The problem began in the eighth month of 1697 (no day given), when the *Chaep'an* led 18 men to S?n' am Temple and back. When asked why he had done this, he complained that Korean merchants used to stay at market until the end of the day and returned home in the dark, but now they left early, and trade became difficult. In addition, he complained that a Tsushima request to revise diplomatic correspondence on Ull?ng Island had been ignored by the Magistrate and not forwarded to the capital.

The matter of Ull?ng Island deserves detailed treatment, but that is also another story. Suffice it to say that in the previous fall and winter of 1696 a dispute over the ownership of Ull?ng Island had reached a conclusion agreeable to the *bakufu* and the Korean court but not to Tsushima islanders. The Tsushima authorities, however, wanted the matter overturned and were pressing Tongnae to re-open negotiations on the matter. Yi Se-jae commented, “[these] people from afar were born stubborn.” The court agreed. To make clear that unauthorized exiting was strictly prohibited, the court directed Magistrate Yi to carve in stone the regulations governing the Waegwan and place this stone outside the Waegwan's main gate.

Again, in the eighth month of 1697 (no day given), the *Chaep'an*, after making daily entreaties to the *Py?lch'a* over Ull?ng Island, suddenly fell silent and after ten days led a group of 94 to S?n' am Temple stating that they wanted to view the fall landscape. Magistrate Yi saw clearly that he was the object of coercive pressure, and since the Japanese authorities themselves were orchestrating matters, he lamented having no one to whom he could argue criminality.

Matters did not abate. Yet again in 1697.8, some 26 Japanese went out and returned. Then 132 left the compound with the purpose of obstructing the road between the Pusan Garrison and the Tongnae Magistrate's office. The activities of these 132 formed the critical core of the incident of 1697 and are described fully in the Japanese document on the incident discussed below. According to the Korean records, the “Wae” obstructed the road, brandished swords, and screamed and yelled. Two swords were lost, presumably in some sort of melee with Koreans. A group of 56 Japanese went to the exterior gate of the Pusan Garrison, demanding to see the Garrison Commander. The Garrison Commander sent a Military Official (K.: *kun'gwan*), Ch?n Yu-gwang, who chided them for being unreasonable. The Japanese overpowered Ch?n and the two servants with him and led them off. Soldiers from the Pusan

Garrison attempted to rescue Ch?n and the others, but the Japanese succeeded in kidnapping them to the Waegwan. Negotiations with the House Master revealed the immediate Japanese demand: deliver the person who abducted the Japanese swords and the Military Official with the two servants will be released. Further negotiations between a Korean Interpreter (a *Y?ggwan* and *P'ansa*, Jr. 5), Ch'oe ?k, the *Hundo* and *Py?lch'a*, and the *Chaep'an*, House Master, and *Taegwan* (J.: *Daikan*) revealed the entire gamut of reported grievances, and Magistrate Yi Se-jae recorded these.

The *Chaep'an* listed four complaints. He desired a revision of the diplomatic notes related to Ull?ng Island; undoubtedly, this meant a demand for Korean approval of Japanese visitations, that is, fishing in the area. The second complaint was that charcoal and firewood deliveries were insufficient. Thirdly, he wanted the Magistrate to relax his prohibitions on Korean merchants travelling after dark, so that the market could remain open longer. The *Chaep'an's* last complaint was that deliveries of official trade rice (converted from cotton) had formerly been brought by two boats in lots of 200 *s?k* per boat, but recently only one boat was operating. The decrease in services allowed deliveries of no more than 200 *s?k* at a time. The reader should note at this point that none of the *Chaep' an's* complaints touched on rice deliveries in arrears, but only on inadequate transport. Finally, the House Master pointed out that the West Hall leaked when it rained and that repairs were usually left undone. Satisfied that the Korean side had heard everything, the Japanese released the Military Official and promised not to storm out of the compound again. The two Korean servants remained under Japanese detention. There were a few token, light canings of Japanese in front of the main gate by Waegwan authorities, but Magistrate Yi was unconvinced of Japanese sincerity.

A directive from the capital accepted the Magistrate's position, shared his distrust, and introduced a new position. Capital officials ordered the Magistrate to discriminate the crimes of the Waegwan leadership from their underlings' transgressions and stop the provisions for the *Chaep'an*, who had obviously directed the affair, and for the First Special Envoy. Although the Envoy was not seen as a ringleader, he was, with the *Chaep' an*, the highest-ranking participant. Supplies for the House Master and those below him were ordered delivered.

In a dispatch dated the ninth month of 1697, a month after the melee on the Pusan Garrison road, Magistrate Yi reported that the *Chaep' an* insisted on attending a tea reception given to an envoy from

Tsushima. We should remember that these “tea receptions” as well as certain banquets for important envoys were the only opportunities the Japanese had to meet the Magistrate personally. They were exploited as a forum to present direct appeals. On this occasion, the *Chaep’an* tendered a complete apology for the previous month's incidents and affirmed his pledge never to do such again. He then proceeded to his real business. He complained of a 5,000 *s?k* shortfall in the delivery of official trade rice; he wanted to negotiate the conversion of official trade cotton to silver; and he was worried that the rate at which official trade cotton had been converted to rice (one bolt of cotton to 12 *tu* of rice) was to be reduced by one *tu*. Finally, he wished to discuss the sale of undelivered rice. The Magistrate assessed the *Chaep’an*'s display as one part apology and one part business. Mostly, however, he thought it pure opportunism.

“We're Going to Give Tongnae Hell”

If we now turn to a Japanese report on the core event of the 1697 incident, or that day when the Military Official and his servants were kidnapped, we will be able to appreciate a fairly different perspective. One document in particular gives us a very detailed account of the incident including its origins and intent. It is a report on a “fight” between Waegwan Japanese and Koreans while the Japanese were illegally passing on the road from Pusan to Tongpy?ng, and was written by the House Master, T?b? Shingor?, as a summary of the incident. According to Shingor?, in the spring of 1697, due to famine in Korea, the customary 16,000 *s?k* of official trade rice could not be delivered. Moreover, the visitation hours for Tongnae merchants were shortened, making private commerce as well as the purchase of fresh daily foodstuffs difficult. Another constant irritant at the Waegwan had also once again become acute: the lack of firewood and charcoal deliveries. Finally, the matter of Ull?ng Island (referred to in Japanese documents as Takeshima) still needed discussion. Although Shingor? was trying to communicate his dissatisfaction with all these matters to Magistrate Yi Se-jae, he became convinced that the liaison officials (*Hundo* and *Py?Ich'a*) were not delivering his messages. Moreover, Shingor? suspected that this business of a famine was a hoax, since he had heard that there was some 20–30,000 *hy?* of rice in the Pusan Garrison warehouses.

Shingor? decided that the best way to get attention was to leave the Waegwan compound illegally and incite a riot, that is, to provoke the local authorities. The Magistrate and Pusan Commander would be sure to take notice, and then Shingor? would be able to deliver his petitions on these

other matters. Thus decided, Shingor? sent out some 36 men to Tongpy?ng, a township within Tongnae, 10 //to the south of the county seat, and to Pusan, 21 //to the south of the county seat and closer to the Waegwan. Groups left the Waegwan on two occasions (seventeenth and twentieth of the eighth month) to stir up trouble, but they returned with no success.

On the twenty-first, Shingor? dispatched 40 men who were ambushed by a group of Koreans brandishing stones and bamboo pikes on the road in front of the Pusan Garrison. A skirmish ensued. Although we see no mention of Korean casualties, one Ichiuemon, an inspector and musketeer in the Japanese party was hit on the head, lost consciousness, and before he could recover, had his long and short swords stolen. The group went and found the “*Jit?*” (headman?) of Pusan village and demanded the swords be given back along with the attacker so that Ichiuemon could exact his revenge and save his honor. The Japanese received nothing and no one, and so took hostages on the spot, adding a threat to their demands. If the swords were not returned and the rock wielder not turned over, then the hostages would be cut down in his place and Japanese from the Waegwan would seize the Pusan Garrison. The swords were shortly returned but no Korean was extradited.

Undoubtedly feeling frustration at a bad plan gotten worse, the Japanese side had seized two Korean bearers and a Military Official as hostages. The bearers were bound, but the Military Official was left without bonds to avoid “complications” at a later date. The whole event had now reached a curious turn. Shingor? was willing to provoke armed conflict and threaten an escalation, but he and his men shied away from delivering an official of the Korean government to be bound and tied. Perhaps cooler heads had prevailed or perhaps Shingor? had reached some threshold of involvement beyond which he dare not go. Our source is not explicit.

On the twenty-second, a *P'ansa* (Jr. 5), an official outranking the usual liaison officers (Jr. 9) but subordinate to the Magistrate (Jr.3), visited the Waegwan for negotiations and before nightfall the Military Official was released to the liaison officials. The *P'ansa* explained in negotiations, as had the headman on the previous day, that the attacker was one in a crowd, and so it would be impossible to determine the actual person. The House Master kept the two bearers until the twenty-fourth when they were released to the *Py?lch'a* who came bearing apologies. The rice for 1697 was never delivered; that year remained on Tsushima's books for decades as “delinquent accounts payable.” What happened to the reduced hours

for the Tongnae merchants, requiring their departure from the Waegwan before sundown, is unknown.

A few points may be taken from this Japanese version of the incident. One, ordinary Koreans did not seek to “avoid” this group of armed Japanese but engaged them with nothing but rocks and bamboo pikes. In short, as Amenomori H?sh? argued at the beginning of this chapter, Japanese “authority” had ceased to frighten Koreans by 1697 and an excessive display of the same “authority” had actually resulted in the humiliation of a Japanese samurai. The right to wear swords was for many lower samurai their only means of class distinction. The cliché is that a warrior without a sword was a warrior without a soul. Matters were even worse for Ichiuemon, since his opponents were peasants and not Korean military men.

Secondly, although brash, Shingor? maintained some sense of limits as evidenced by his decision not to bind up the military officer. A similar concern appears in Shichiuemon's recorded statement that is included in the report. Shichiuemon made it clear that he wanted to “cut down” any Korean of consequence to defend his stained honour but admitted this would be “stupid,” bowed to his superiors, swallowed his pride, and promised to do nothing of the kind.

The most important point of all, however, is to take note of the Japanese willingness to employ violence as a negotiating tactic. The purposive character of rioting is demonstrated House Master T?b? Shingor?'s moment of candour in his reports: “we’re going to give Tongnae hell.” From a more detached position, H?sh? criticises rioting in the following terms.

Understand that [Japanese storming out of the Japan House] and proceeding to Tongnae is tantamount to crossing swords with [the Magistrate]; [those who go] may not come back alive.... Thinking that [sending people] to Tongnae will put the [Korean] Interpreters in a very difficult position and get them into your hands and thereby settle matters is a calculated move that will certainly be ill-advised.

From these two pieces of evidence in contemporary Japanese documents, we can state that “disorderly exiting” was a consciously applied negotiating technique.

Life at the Waegwan was undoubtedly difficult, since the daily necessities of food and fuel had to be supplied by the Korean government or local merchants. When supplies were cut off or delinquent, tempers naturally flared. In this case, the situation seems to have been compounded by a clash of personalities between the House Master, T?b? Shingor?, and the Korean liaison officials. We can imagine that Shingor?'s options were not so limited and that he may well have been able to get his concerns a hearing in Tongnae without resorting to rioting. Nevertheless, our purpose here is not to condemn any particular method but to emphasize the difficult unpredictability posed to the Tongnae Magistrate by the Japanese in the Waegwan. In the end, Shingor? expressed satisfaction that rice deliveries began again, although the Waegwan never did receive its 16,000 *s?k* of rice for 1697.

When we compare the two versions of the incident left to us we find points of agreement and points of difference. The general outline of the incident is the same: Japanese left the compound; they fell into some kind of scuffle with Koreans; a Japanese had his swords taken; and with no immediate response to demands, a Military Official and two servants were taken as hostages to be released later. The Japanese account also corroborates Magistrate Yi Se-jae on two important points. One, Waegwan officials masterminded the entire incident. Two, the purpose was to put pressure on the Magistrate to accede to Japanese demands.

The largest difference is apparent in the comments on the importance and even size of the central Japanese complaint. Yi Se-jae saw the Japanese concerned above all else with the diplomatic notes on Ull?ng Island. The Tongnae Magistrate may have been overly sensitive to implicit Tsushima claims on Korean territory when he heard the House Master insist on re-opening negotiations over Japanese access to Ull?ng Island. The Waegwan House Master certainly begins his report with a discussion of the failure to have the notes re-written, but then goes on to discuss his other grievances, next being the fact that in recent years, annual rice transfers for official trade never exceeded 10,000 *s?k*. In fact, the House Master thought he was being defrauded of rice owed to the Waegwan as a part of official trade. The House Master's report repeatedly returns to this problem and it becomes the centrepiece of his grievances. By contrast, the Magistrate's dispatches portray the issue of delinquent

rice deliveries as an afterthought and denominate the shortfall at only 5,000 *s?k*, reporting this figure as an amount mentioned by the *Chaep' an*.

The difference in identifying the central Japanese grievance may have arisen from various factors. To the House Master, the first concern was the delivery of rice, a key commodity not just for those in the Waegwan, but also very important to Tsushima, which was dependent on Korean rice. The Magistrate may have played down this complaint to avoid drawing attention to his own administration. Too close an investigation may have revealed corruption on the Korean side and the theft of rice before it got to the Japanese. Was the Magistrate directing the capital's attention elsewhere as a diversion, or do we simply have another example of miscommunication?

Later Incidents

Shortages of food and fuel at the Waegwan are dominant themes in later incidents. In the third month of 1710, some 29 Japanese illegally left the Waegwan saying they were off to buy fish and vegetables. They returned after persuasion, but shortly thereafter 15 went out to the west. Women had been forbidden from attending the morning market and the number of vendors had fallen off. This problem was real enough to Magistrate Kw?n Yi-jin, although not serious enough in his opinion to warrant un-authorized departures from the Waegwan.

The fire behind this particular smoke was a *Taegwan* who had been “chattering” about a “full payment” of the official trade rice and who had been making threats about rioting. Magistrate Kw?n held the *Taegwan* ultimately responsible and worked for his punishment and removal. When 57 more Japanese stormed out, the House Master finally made clear their grievances: fish, vegetables, and rice were in short supply. The House Master then became a target of punishment by the Magistrate. In accordance with the precedents established during the 1697 incident for selective withholding of provisions, Magistrate Kw?n targeted the House Master's rations to make clear Korean displeasure with Japanese “disorderly exiting.” By the eighth month, the House Master was “weeping and wailing” and the court advised re-supplying the official, since some limits had to be attached to the punishment. Otherwise, the court pointed out, the Japanese will cease to come and a “new,” potentially dangerous situation may develop. All Korean officials knew this meant a resort to piracy.

We should recall the Japanese concerns over deficient rice deliveries from the 1697 incident and here, we see Magistrate Kw?n considering this problem, if only obliquely, in a report from the third month of 1710.

...I have detected the desires of the Wae. [They want] two years of official trade rice put together and paid in full. Afterwards, on top of this, they want the official trade rice for this year given to them in the fall. [But] first they storm out and then they make requests...

Occasionally Korean policy met with success. In the seventh month of 1736, some 11 or 13 Japanese rioted and stormed out to Pusan demanding charcoal and firewood. Eleven Japanese were sent to Tsushima for punishment in the eighth month. Before the end of the year in the twelfth month, the House Master reported that the two leaders were sent to provincial areas as slaves in perpetuity.

In 1807, an odd affair occurred. A *Ch'awae* to Request the Dispatch of a Tongsinsa (an envoy to request a Korean Embassy) led 110 men to press their request for the dispatch of a Korean Embassy to Edo. Five “flying ships” or small transports that worked the waters between Tsushima and Pusan also participated, so the effect was riot by both land and sea. Large groups of 50 or so Japanese camped at the county seat. Magistrate O Han-w?n reported no other demands, threw up his hands in despair and awaited a censure from the court that never came.

The cause behind the incident was probably simple. Tsushima's private trade began undergoing great changes from the mid to late eighteenth century that saw a shift from high-value luxury commodities, such as ginseng, to lower-value, bulkier goods like laver and cow hides. The resulting fall off in the value of trade meant that the prospects of *bakufu* subsidies to host a Korean Embassy became steadily more attractive, and concerted efforts were marshalled to obtain Korean approval for the dispatch of another Envoy to Edo. Actually, the final Korean Embassy of the pre-modern period left Pusan in 1811 but got no farther than Tsushima due to budget constraints in both Hans?ng and Edo. Both governments had settled on Tsushima as an acceptable site for diplomatic receptions, and Tsushima garnered its sought-after *bakufu* subsidies.

Finally, we have a report on an incident in 1824 during which Japanese broke into government offices in Tumo. No grievances are reported and there is not enough detailed information to hazard an analysis of the incident. This is the last Korean record.

Conclusion

Throughout the post-Hideyoshi period, the Japanese saw rioting and groups of men leaving the Waegwan without permission as one more negotiating strategy to be employed with Tongnae. Prior to 1678 and the new Waegwan at Ch'oryang, Korean authorities had no mutually agreed legal standing from which they could demand punishment for offenders. After 1678 and the explicit agreements delimiting Japanese movement, the Tongnae Magistrate had a clear interest to uphold. Ordinary denizens of the Waegwan might be expected to wander out occasionally, but when the Waegwan authorities conspired to propel or even to lead their underlings out the gate, matters became serious, as we saw in the first real test of this principle in 1697. As a practical way to handle the guilty, the court suggested ascertaining the complicity of any Japanese officials and then selectively withholding their support. Such a policy was appreciated by later Magistrates and employed. We must recall that, in Korean minds, the Japanese were the guests of the Korean state. For them to make demands and to riot was reprehensible. Magistrate after Magistrate used the word "cunning" to describe the Waegwan Japanese, since the Magistrates recognized "disorderly exiting" from the Waegwan as a tactic to apply pressure and obtain some further advantage from Korea.

The Japanese saw themselves as engaged in trade and diplomacy. Undelivered rice or diplomatic problems that turned not to one's favour were contestable matters. Official rice was a purchased commodity and the spoils of diplomacy were fair game for any means at hand, even limited violence. Occasionally, extreme means were necessary to pressure one's opposite number. But H?sh? was right. With the establishment of the new Waegwan at Ch'oryang, the Korean government got agreements from Tsushima to limit Japanese movement, and they intended to enforce them. Thus, groups of Japanese running about waving swords carried no "authority" or lingering aura of martial "prowess" left over from the time of Hideyoshi's invasion. Such displays had become unacceptable by common consent. True authority now resided with the Tongnae Magistrate in the form of binding agreements. The problem for the Magistrate was that, although the Japanese had formally given their word to abide by their promise, their actions spoke otherwise.

Unlike Peter Sahlins' study of the Cerdanya valley, we do not find local elites appealing to national centers for aid in settling local claims. We also do not find a variety of sovereignties collapsing into a territorial definition of the boundary. Rather, we find the local representative of a centralised state seeking to impose his authority over unruly visitors. In other words, we find an illustration of Fredrik Barth's formulation of the ethnic boundary: "the standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged." The Japanese were not recognising Korean authority; they were not seeking ascription; they were adamantly rejecting absorption, and by so doing, they were making the boundary clear and the differences rigid.

Notes