

Kaya between Paekche and Silla: A Struggle for Autonomy and Prosperity

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Studies of the Kaya states (?-562), a group of small states that evolved along the Naktong River and its tributaries in the southern Korean peninsula, had been not only neglected by Korean scholars for centuries but distorted by modern Japanese scholars until the 1980s. Thanks to the efforts of dedicated archaeologists and historians since, a number of studies have been published on Kaya, and today many think that the term the “Three Kingdoms’ period” is misleading because it fails to include Kaya (Seth 2016, 29). Despite Kaya’s importance, when we study Kaya’s history, we continue to rely on sources compiled by states and nations other than Kaya centuries after its demise. The *Samguk sagi* (History of the Three Kingdoms), the oldest extant Korean history compiled in the twelfth century, inevitably reflects viewpoints centered on Silla (?-935), the conqueror of Kaya and ultimate unifier of the Korean peninsula in the seventh century. The *Nihon shoki* (Chronicles of Japan), compiled in the early eighth century, contain many valuable Kaya-related accounts, but they artificially elevate the Yamato state, the unifier of the Japanese archipelago, and take the side of the Paekche kingdom (?-660) in the peninsula, the provider of both scribes and written materials to the Yamato court. Modern historians, therefore, must make special efforts to separate facts from interpretations, which are often blended together in the presentations of early history.

This paper outlines the trajectories of the three important Kaya states, Kūmgwan Kaya, Alla, and Tae Kaya, following their chronologies and political circumstances of that era. The divergent decisions and actions made by the three states are discussed, and their underlying factors are probed. It is known that the sixth century saw Paekche’s eastward expansion and Silla’s westward expansion squeeze Kaya in the middle, and many studies treat the Kaya states as victims of the power politics of the era. It is true that Kaya was threatened by Paekche and Silla’s encroachments and often vacillated between them. The Kaya leaders, however, actively sought ways to maintain autonomy and prosperity in the given circumstances and made their best possible decisions at the time. The Kaya states’ endeavor for survival in the hostile environment presents an important page in early Korean history.

Kūmgwan Kaya and its Decision to Surrender

Kaya had long historical relations with Silla. The *Sanguozhi* (Records of the Three Kingdoms), the Chinese annals compiled in the late third century, records that Saro in present-day Kyōngju, Silla’s precursor, and Kuya in present-day Kimhae, Kūmgwan’s precursor, as part of the Chinhan and the Pyōnhan, groups of emerging small states roughly to the east and west of the Naktong River respectively. The *Sanguozhi* records that the Chinhan and Pyōnhan peoples shared the same dwellings and customs, and archaeologists note the typological similarities of artifacts and tomb structures in the two regions (Seth 2016, 22; Park 2012, 108). In sum, the origins of the Chinhan and Pyōnhan peoples were closely related.

The *Samguk Yusa* (The memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) includes mythological accounts of the founders of Silla and Kūmgwan Kaya, reflecting their actual relations in the third century. According to the accounts, a boat carrying a young boy initially drifted to Kūmgwan Kaya ruled by the first king Suro, but it moved on to the harbor near Silla. The boy later became an early Silla king, Sōk T’alhae (Ilyōn 1991, 46). Before T’alhae became a Silla ruler, he paid a visit to

Suro and challenged to take over his throne. They competed in magical skills, transforming themselves to a hawk and an eagle, but T'alhae acknowledged Suro's victory in the end (Ibid., 182). These mythical stories suggest that the two emerging states had early contacts by sea, and Kŭmgwan outshined Silla either economically or politically.

Kŭmgwan indeed was a thriving gateway community thanks to its iron production and natural harbor located at the mouth of the Naktong River. The *Sanguozhi* mentions that the peoples in and outside of the peninsula, including those from the Chinese commanderies and the Japanese archipelago, came and traded to obtain iron there (Yi 2001, 247-249). Thus, Kŭmgwan's relationship with the people in the archipelago goes back in the third century, and, according to archaeologies, by the fourth century, the Yamato royalty and the Kŭmgwan royalty appear to have exchanged their prestige goods and forged special ties (Pak 2007, 34). Likewise, Kŭmgwan had a close relationship with Paekche. It is likely that Kŭmgwan played the role of intermediary when Paekche first contacted Yamato, although the *Nihon shoki* attributes the mediating role to T'aksun, a small neighboring Kaya state (*Nihongi* 1956 I, 246).

Kŭmgwan naturally became a junior partner to Paekche and played a critical role in the latter's war against Koguryŏ from 392 to 404. According to the inscriptions on the Koguryŏ king Kwanggaet'o's stele, the formidable Koguryŏ army seized Kŭmgwan and moved on to punish the Wa soldiers brought to the peninsula from the archipelago. Kŭmgwan took the brunt of the Koguryŏ attacks and never recovered its former glory even after the war ended. The eastern shore of the Naktong River, formerly under Kŭmgwan came under the control of Silla, Koguryŏ's junior partner. From the beginning of the fifth century, the power and wealth of Kŭmgwan rulers declined, as the absence of large-scale tombs in the Kimhae region suggests (Kim Taesik 2012, 29; Lee 2012, 188).

The *Samguk sagi* accounts concerning the early sixth century make two important references to Kŭmgwan Kaya: the Kŭmgwan king's meeting with the Silla king Pŏphŭng in 524 and the former's surrender to the latter in 532 (Kim Pusik 2012, 118-122). Because the *Samguk sagi* mentions the marriage alliance request by the "Kaya king," who undoubtedly meant the king of Tae Kaya, just prior to the 524 entry, some scholars argue that the "Kaya king" who met Pŏphŭng at "Silla's newly opened land in the southern boundary" was the Tae Kaya king (Kim, T'ae-sik 2010, 247). But the king who traveled all the way to the land that belonged to Silla could not be the powerful Tae Kaya king, who held a large sphere of influence at the time. If we assume that the Kŭmgwan king Kuhae went to meet the Silla king Pŏphŭng in 524, what was discussed between them? Although no details are conveyed in the *Samguk sagi*, it appears that the meeting began and ended in friendly terms. In 532, only eight years after the meeting, Kuhae surrendered to Silla, taking to the capital of Silla his immediate family comprised of his wife and three sons, along with the state's treasures.

We can conjecture that the period between 524 and 532 was not a time of peace for Kŭmgwan Kaya. According to the *Nihon shoki*, Kŭmgwan and its neighboring small Kaya states, T'aksun and T'akkit'an, were defeated by the Silla forces, and this prompted the Yamato government to send military aid. In 527, hearing that Kŭmgwan and T'akkit'an "had been conquered by Silla." the Yamato government was about to dispatch Afumi no Kena no Omi and his large army to southern Kaya, but this deployment was postponed due to the Kyushu strongman Iwai's blockage of waterways. In 529, when Kena finally crossed the Korea strait, he went to Alla in present-day Haman, instead of Kŭmgwan, and ended up being pressured by the Silla army of three thousand men led by General Isabu. It is said that Isabu seized and plundered four villages including Kŭmgwan (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 20-21). Kŭmgwan was at the mercy of the Silla army stationed nearby.

Prof. Sin Ka-yŏng points out that Silla followed a pattern of gradual absorption whenever it conquered a state (Sin 2013). A good example is its annexation of Koguryŏ, which was allowed to exist nominally for several years under the leadership of Ansŭng, an offspring of the last Koguryŏ king, until he was transferred to Silla. Once Ansŭng and the top ruling class were gone, Silla controlled the Koguryŏ land and people through direct means, utilizing the remaining lower Koguryŏ officials (Kim, Pusik 2011, 263-264). Silla must have employed the same strategic process at the time of Kŭmgwan's fall. First, Silla urged the Kŭmgwan king Kuhae to surrender by the carrot and stick approach, harassing his people and offering him favorable terms at the same time. Second, once he surrendered, as the *Samguk sagi* notes, Silla treated Kuhae well with propriety and even gave the position of sangdŭng, an important official, thus admitting him in Silla's council of nobles. With the ruling family gone to the Silla capital, the land and people of Kŭmgwan came directly under Silla, with Kŭmgwan's lower elites now reporting to Silla. Kuhae drew his salary nominally from Kŭmgwan, now his fief, or stipend land. His sons joined the Silla officialdom, and the third son Muryŏk later reached the title of kakkan, making critical contributions to Silla's victory at battle fields. Kŭmgwan was assimilated to Silla in this manner.

The fact that Kuhae and his family were warmly received and Kŭmgwan became assimilated to may have stemmed in part from the common cultural heritage shared by Kaya and Silla. Another factor may be Silla's developmental stage that Silla at this time. As Richard McBride points out, the Silla government had been run collectively by the council of hereditary nobles, kanji, and the ruler called maripkan. It was in the sixth century when the maripkan, who was only first among equals, gradually became the king whose power and authority surpassed that of the council. During the time of King Pŏphŭng (r. 514-540), his power and authority grew thanks to multiple factors, including general importation of Chinese culture, represented by his dispatch of envoys to the southern Chinese dynasty Liang (521) and the use of the Chinese-style designation "king," as well as the adoption of Buddhism (McBride 2011, 244). In the first half of the sixth century, the Silla state structure was still in flux and far from being centralized, and this flexibility contributed to Kuhae's admission to the council of nobles with no apparent opposition. Kuhae's decision to surrender to Silla came at the most opportune time.

Silla obtained from Kŭmgwan fertile lands, military troops, iron and skilled iron workers, and access to the lower Naktong River. These invaluable possessions undoubtedly added strengths necessary for Silla to successfully compete with Paekche and Koguryŏ in the next century. The fact that such valuable additions came to Silla with no bloodshed must have elevated the position of Pŏphŭng, the man who had orchestrated Kŭmgwan's voluntary surrender (Ibid., 250).

Alla's Strategy

The state of Alla Kaya was located at present-day Haman, just south of the confluence of the Naktong and the Nam Rivers, approximately 30 miles west of Kimhae. Alla enjoyed easy access to the Kaya states along the Naktong and the Nam Rivers as well as to the natural harbors located at Chindong Bay on the southern coast. Alla was formerly known as Aya or Ara, one of the twelve Pyŏnhan states mentioned in the *Sanguozhi*, and grew to be a prosperous economic center as attested by the spread of All-style pottery in large parts of Kaya in the fourth century (Pak 2007, 38; Nam 2003).

Alla-style pottery has been excavated in many archaeological sites in western Japan, including Kyushu, Shikoku, and Kinki regions. In contrast to the Kŭmgwan-Yamato relations led by ruling houses, Alla's relationship with the archipelago was not dominated by a particular archipelago

region or power. Archaeological finds suggests that many regional powers in western Japan independently interacted with Alla with no mediation by the Yamato government. Further, many Alla-style artifacts unearthed in western Japan turn out to be the product of local manufacturing by Alla artisans using local materials. A substantial number of Alla people migrated to many parts of the archipelago, and, in turn, a certain number of people of the archipelago, particularly from Kyushu, moved to Alla and its vicinities as attested by Kyushu-style mounted tombs and burial goods (Pak 2008, 144).

At the time of Koguryō's southern incursions around the year 400, Alla fought against the Koguryō-Silla forces alongside Paekche and Kūmgwan Kaya. Despite the physical damage and the resultant diminishing sphere of influence, Alla maintained its presence as an important Kaya state through the fifth century. From the second half of the fifth century to the early sixth century, Alla's ruling class left impressive mound tombs with burial goods second only to the ones in Tae Kaya (Pak 2007, 38-41).

Alla was where Paekche and Silla collided in their encroachment of Kaya in the middle of the sixth century. Paekche under King Muryōng expanded eastward and took over Kaya as far as present-day Hadong at the mouth of the Sōmjīn River, previously controlled by Tae Kaya. Silla, as discussed above, occupied Kūmgwan and its neighbors. It was only natural for the two kingdoms that sought further expansion to collide in Alla, located in the midway position between Hadong and Kimhae. According to the *Nihon shoki*, Paekche, fearing Silla's westward advance, moved its army to Alla and built a fortress there (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 25).

At this point, Alla sought assistance from the Japanese archipelago, particularly from the Yamato government. According to the *Nihon shoki*, in 529, the "king of Imna" visited Yamato and asked Ohotomo no Kanamura, Yamato's important official and aristocrat, for military aid to ward off Silla attacks, referring to historical ties between Kaya and Yamato. Whether or not the king of "Imna" refers to the Alla ruler is unknown. Hearing of the plight of Kaya, however, King Keitai of Yamato urged Kena no Omi, who had already been sent to Alla earlier that year, to help "Imna" find a way to reconcile with Silla. Kena was invited to Alla's newly-built tall government building to discuss the matter with the Alla king and officials, although Silla and Paekche representatives stationed in Alla were not invited (*Nihongi* 1956, II, 19-20).

Why did Alla seek help from Yamato when threatened by Paekche and Silla's encroachments? While both Paekche and Silla had territorial ambitions for Alla, Yamato had little, if any, territorial ambition for southern Korea, despite the *Nihon shoki* rhetoric of Yamato's control and possession across the Korea strait. Yamato and regional powers of the archipelago had benefited from advanced peninsular goods and technology brought through trade, migration, and other interactions, and they sought to perpetuate this relationship particularly with the Kaya states, and Alla was one of the closest partners geographically and historically. The trade relations, accompanied by occasional military aid, with Yamato and other archipelago powers were also beneficial to Alla as they contributed to economic prosperity and posed no threat to political autonomy.

Prewar Japanese scholars contended that the early Yamato state of Japan had dominated the southern Korean peninsula, particularly Kaya, through its agency called Mimana Nihonfu (K: Imna Ilbonbu), "Japanese office in Imna (southern Kaya)," for two centuries until Kaya's demise. Their argument is based largely on the *Nihon shoki*'s frequent references to the Mimana Nihonfu in the accounts concerning Yamato-Kaya relations in the 520s to 540s. This term, however, was likely the *Nihon shoki* compilers' invention, and what the term referred to was in fact a group of Alla residents who had originated from "Wa," the Japanese archipelago (Mori 2010, 170).

Indeed, some “Wa” elites and their followers lived in settlements in Alla, So Kaya, and other southern Kaya states, serving as mediators in trade and other activities involving Kaya and the archipelago. We can surmise that a number of men had migrated from the archipelago to Kaya from the late fifth century, as the *Nihon shoki* refers to Kena no Omi’s encounter with “Kara-ko” (Kara children), who were men born of the union between men from the archipelago and Kaya women (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 22). Kena’s failure to impose a Japanese custom on the Alla community comprised of Kara-ko and men from the archipelago suggests that these individuals were not Yamato subjects, but independent men assimilated to the Kaya society.

Paekche was well aware of these hybrid men residing in Alla. King Sōng of Paekche, seeking to bring the Kaya states under his wing, invited their representatives to his new capital Sabi, present-day Puyō, in 541 and 544. Alla sent more representatives to Sabi than any other Kaya states: three Kaya leaders and Kibi no Omi, an Alla resident of Wa descent, in 541 and two Kaya leaders and Kibi no Omi in 544. According to Sōng’s address that appears in the *Nihon shoki*, three Alla residents named Kahachi no Atahe, Yanasa, and Mado had descended from Nakanda Kappae, a Kaya man killed by Paekche in the late fifth century, were leading the Nihonfu, or the community of people originally from the archipelago or of mixed ancestry, but they often contacted Silla and acted against the interests of Paekche, in part due to their historical resentment against Paekche (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 50). Sōng sought to obtain the Kaya leaders’ agreement to have these pro-Silla men removed and get Paekche fortresses built in southern Kaya. The Kaya representatives avoided answering Sōng’s questions although they were pleased to receive valuable Paekche gifts (*Ibid.*, 51). The leaders of the Kaya states, particularly Alla, were alarmed of Paekche expansionist ambitions, and thus sought to use the Nihonfu to indirectly contact Silla (Nam 2003, 251).

Realizing that Yamato failed to offer much, Alla sought help from another outside power, Koguryō. The *Nihon shoki* relates that in 548 Alla, through secret communication, successfully persuaded Koguryō to attack Paekche. But the scheme crumbled when Paekche, bolstered by Silla’s aid, drove the Koguryō troops away. Alla’s clandestine communication with Koguryō was exposed to Paekche (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 62).

Was Alla alarmed of Paekche’s invasion only and not concerned of Silla’s expansion? The events that followed in the next few years suggest that Alla was just as alarmed of Silla’s growth. According to the *Nihon shoki*, in 552, Alla, Tae Kaya, and Paekche jointly sent envoys to the Yamato government to request aid for their impending fight against Silla. In the previous year, the Paekche-Silla forces won battles against Koguryō, and this resulted in Paekche’s recovery of the lower Han River region, which had been lost to Koguryō since 475, as well as Silla’s occupation of the upper Han River region. By 553, however, Paekche was compelled to hand over the newly recovered land to the burgeoning Silla forces, thus allowing Silla to possess the entire Han River region. In the following year, the Kaya-Paekche joint forces attacked Silla in retaliation at Mount Kwansan Fortress, but, once King Sōng was killed in the battle, the Paekche-Kaya forces collapsed and suffered a huge loss. The *Samguk sagi* relates that the joint forces numbered nearly thirty thousand (Kim Pusik 2012, 126). Although this number can be an exaggeration, we can surmise that both Paekche and the Kaya states, including Alla, went all out for the war against Silla.

Alla’s refusal of Paekche’s proposals in the 540s should not be interpreted as an expression of anti-Paekche or pro-Silla sentiments. Alla simply could not accept the Paekche king Sōng’s aggressive policies that would harm Alla’s autonomy and prosperity. Alla, along with the other Kaya states, welcomed interactions with Paekche when cultural goods were involved. Some scholars believe that the incident of 548 prompted Paekche to strip Alla of autonomy and decision-

making power. According to this interpretation Alla did not decide to fight the war against Silla at Mount Kwansan in 554, but Alla troops were simply mobilized by Paekche (Kim Taesik 2007, 77). It is unknown how much power Paekche held over Alla at this time. It is likely, however, that Alla realized that Silla's rapid territorial expansion posed a threat much greater than the threat of Paekche's gradual encroachment. The Alla leaders must have known that the balance had tilted in Silla's favor and the only way for their state to survive was to bring back the balance of power by taking Paekche's side.

Tae Kaya's Rebellion

Decades after Kūmgwan Kaya's decline early in the fifth century, Panp'a, a Kaya state located in present-day Koryŏng by the middle Naktong River, continued to evolve and built a hierarchical network of states in the region. Panp'a came to be called Tae Kaya ("great Kaya"). By the second half of the fifth century, Tae Kaya's sphere of influence stretched to the Naktong River in the east, the Nam River in the south, present-day Namwŏn, North Chŏlla province, in the northwest, and the Sŏmjŏn River in the southwest, as attested by the spread of Tae Kaya-style pottery (Pak 2007, 54). The growth of Tae Kaya is attributed to its successful iron industry, long-distance trade through a transportation network, the migration of the Kūmgwan people, and Paekche's temporary decline due to its defeat to Koguryŏ in 475 (Kim T'ae-sik 2012, 29-31).

Tae Kaya makes its important appearance in Chinese history in 479, when its king Haji sent a tributary mission to the Southern Qi court in China and received a Chinese title. Tae Kaya's diplomatic feat with the southern Chinese dynasty was remarkable, particularly when compared with Silla, which had no such contact with China until 521, when Pŏphŭng sent his envoy to the Liang court (Kim Pusik 2012, 118). The *Samguk sagi* relates that in 496 Tae Kaya sent the Silla king a white pheasant with a long tail, possibly to congratulate him on his troops' successful campaign against the Koguryŏ troops in the previous year (Ibid., 107). These events indicate that Tae Kaya's standing was equal to, or possibly higher than, that of Silla by the late fifth century. The excavation of elaborate mounted tombs in Chisang-dong, Koryŏng, also attest to the maturity of the Tae Kaya state centered on hereditary kings by that time (Pak 2012, 57). Tae Kaya grew and developed perhaps a step ahead of Silla.

The environment favorable to Tae Kaya's growth and prosperity disappeared in the early sixth century when Paekche's eastward expansion reached the Sŏmjŏn River. Despite Tae Kaya's violent opposition, Paekche took away the region formerly under Tae Kaya's influence by 515. Paekche's aggressions prompted the Tae Kaya king Inoe to sign an alliance with Silla by means of marriage to the daughter of a Silla nobleman in 522. This alliance came to a halt several years later when Silla's expansionist ambitions came to light. A hundred Silla retainers who had accompanied the bride to Tae Kaya turned out to be promoting Silla's cause in many parts of Kaya. According to the *Nihon shoki* account of this incident, some Kaya leaders demanded to dissolve the alliance while King Inoe refused to let go his Silla bride (*Nihongi* 1956 II, 18). At this juncture, Tae Kaya's elites were divided, and the alliance with Silla collapsed.

According to Prof. No Chung-guk's careful study, Tae Kaya's next king Kasil ascended to the throne sometimes in the 530s. He is best known for having musician Urŭk compose songs with the musical instrument Kayagŭm for the purpose of bringing unity to the Kaya states centered on Tae Kaya (*Samguk sagi* II, 179; Tanaka 1997, 49-52). Kasil kept distance from both Silla and Paekche, but he was flexible enough to send his representative to the Paekche meeting presided by King Sŏng in 541 and 544. Kasil was succeeded by Tosŏlji, the last king of Tae Kaya, who unfortunately did not inherit Kasil's wisdom, since the *Samguk sagi* refers to Tosŏlji as a man of

indulgence in luxury and pleasure (Kim, Pusik 1996, 179). The king's inability to rule may have contributed to Urūk's flight to Silla, in search of a safe heaven, by 551, when he performed for the Silla king Chinhŭng (r. 540-576).

Little information is available as to what happened to Tae Kaya after its devastating defeat in the war between Paekche-Kaya and Silla in 554. The *Samguk sagi* relates in the Silla annals as well as in the biography of young warrior Sadaham that, in response to Kaya's rebellion in 562, the Silla military comprised of five thousand horsemen seized the Tae Kaya capital. Taken aback by the arrival of the large Silla troops, the Tae Kaya people did not know what to do and surrendered completely (Kim Pusik 2012, 127; Kim Pusik 1991 II, 397-398). But the term rebellion implies that Tae Kaya was already placed under Silla's control. What had become of Tae Kaya between 554 and 562?

Silla must have pursued the same gradual assimilation policy with Tae Kaya, just as it did with Kūmgwan. This means that after the defeat in 554 Tae Kaya was placed under Silla's indirect control with the Tae Kaya king and nobles still being present but deprived of their power. The next stage of control must have come when Silla transferred Tae Kaya's top ruling family to Silla and placed its own generals and officials to fill the vacuum. According to this plan, the remaining Tae Kaya elites were to directly follow Silla governors and generals in the end. It is possible that Tae Kaya's king and highest nobles were moved to Silla before 562, and many middle to lower elites as well as commoners remained there. Since the *Samguk sagi* accounts of the Tae Kaya rebellion make no mention of the last Tae Kaya king, it is unlikely that he took part in the insurrection. The rebellion of 562 must have been led by the elites who remained in Tae Kaya and refused to be subjugated by the Silla rulers.

Although the *Samguk sagi* accounts refer to the incident as Kaya's rebellion, they mention no violence used by the Tae Kaya people. It appears that the people of Tae Kaya simply refused to submit to Silla's orders, and Silla quickly reacted to that decision by force. The Kaya elites and commoners involved in the refusal to submission were apparently killed, and some were made into slaves. The Silla king Chinhŭng offered Sadahim 300 Tae Kaya people to be his slaves, though he declined. Silla reacted to Tae Kaya's insubordination with harsh punishments.

Tae Kaya's rebellion is an important indication of the relationship between Silla and Tae Kaya, now the ruler and the ruled. There are important differences between Kūmgwan Kaya's surrender to Silla and Tae Kaya's submission to Silla. While Kūmgwan had been isolated and taken a weak position to its neighbor Silla since the early fifth century, Tae Kaya grew and extended its sphere of influence through the sixth century. Tae Kaya's development as an early state was probably a step ahead of that of Silla, as demonstrated in the areas of diplomacy and trade, and Tae Kaya kings succeeded in centralization of power to a large degree, something Silla could not accomplish till the mid sixth century (Tikhonov 2000, 21). Tae Kaya also had sophisticated culture as exemplified by Urūk's Kayagŭm performance, which the Silla king Chinhŭng had his musicians imitate.

With the king gone and Silla's direct rule ushered in, the Tae Kaya elites could not swallow their pride and live under Silla subjugation. Thus, they rose up in revolt, but were quickly suppressed by the Silla forces. It is possible that Silla's military subjugation of Tae Kaya in 562 was followed by a heavy-handed occupation of Tae Kaya. This tragic end of Tae Kaya, once the presiding state of Kaya, was brought about by its own decisions and actions in search of autonomy and prosperity.

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